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In countless cities across the United States, emergency shelters and transitional 
housing have been inadequate to meet the needs of a growing number of people experiencing 
homelessness.1 Existing shelters and transitional housing often lack space to accommodate 
the sheer number of people needing shelter, resulting in overcrowding inside and thousands of 
people left to seek other options outside. Many people are excluded from shelters based on 
gender identity, family makeup, criminal histories, or a lack of documented identification. Still 
others avoid shelters based on past experiences of harassment, requirements to participate in 
religious activities, or unsanitary conditions. As a result, shelters are often functionally 
inaccessible to vast numbers of people experiencing homelessness. Because encampments can 
pose many of these same barriers, they must do more than replicate the flaws of other shelter 
systems if encampments are to be a meaningful alternative. 
Several cities have implemented authorized encampments2 as interim shelter options 
for people experiencing homelessness. An authorized encampment is a community of 
unhoused people lawfully living outdoors on property owned by a city, university, church, or 
other entity, and operated by a body with oversight capabilities and access to human service 
providers. Each element can vary by encampment model—for example, some encampments 
begin as unauthorized sites and later achieve permitted status by city ordinance. In those 
instances, communities develop prior to the encampment becoming sanctioned by the city, as 
opposed to communities created by application or by compulsory relocation. While the 
specifics differ, each case study discussed herein shares four common features of authorized 
encampments: (1) a community of unhoused people, (2) present by permission of the 
landowner or local ordinance, (3) on land owned by someone else, (4) with formal operating 
and governance structures aimed at maintaining the encampment and rehousing the 
residents. 
Encampments demonstrate several benefits for people experiencing homelessness: 
• Safety and Security. People living outdoors alone, in pairs, or in unauthorized 
encampments are often subjected to “sweeps”: government action enforcing laws 
that prohibit public camping. During sweeps, homeless people are forced to clear 
out of the area and whatever belongings they cannot carry are often seized or 
                                                             
1 This brief will primarily refer to people experiencing homelessness using person-first language to emphasize that 
homelessness is temporary experience, not an identity or status more significant than personhood. Common 
terminology like “the homeless” and even “homeless people” can be dehumanizing, emphasizing one’s current 
living arrangements as a person’s sole identity. With that concern in mind, this brief will refer to “people 
experiencing homelessness,” “unhoused people,” and occasionally “homeless people” interchangeably when 
necessary for sentence flow and clarity, with the intention that readers will understand that homelessness is an 
experience shared by encampment residents, but it is not their sole identity. 
2 Cities vary in terminology employed to describe authorized homeless encampments. This brief will at times refer 
to “authorized,” “permitted” and “sanctioned,” and “tent cities” and “encampments” interchangeably, as 
consistent with the terminology used in a given case study. 
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destroyed. Besides disrupting the already chaotic life of an unhoused person, 
sweeps can violate constitutional guarantees against unreasonable seizures, 
punishment based on status, and due process. Beyond sweeps, people living on the 
streets face harassment and even violence by police and passersby, creating a 
pervasive and persistent sense of extreme uncertainty. Encampments can offer 
some degree of safety and security for residents  by virtue of enclosed spaces 
patrolled by resident security teams, assurance that their belongings can remain in 
a specific place all day, and certainty regarding where to sleep the next night. 
• Community. Homelessness can be an extremely isolating experience, and 
chronically homeless people sometimes describe the experience as living on the 
outskirts of society. Living in a community of people with shared experiences can 
help to erode that stigma over time and create space for supportive relationship-
building. 
• Autonomy. As opposed to shelter environments with strict directives about when 
to come and go and how to behave while inside, many encampments are governed 
by group living agreements developed by residents themselves, allowing some 
degree of self-determination for people to develop the rules by which they live. The 
simple fact of having a private space (even if only a tent) to oneself and the freedom 
to come and go as one chooses can have a dignity-restoring effect for people who 
have experienced the dehumanizing conditions of shelters and living on the street. 
• Stability. Many housing-first models have demonstrated that providing safe, 
consistent shelter can be a positive step for people dealing with chemical 
dependency, mental illness, poor physical health, and other factors that contribute 
to homelessness. Stable living arrangements can eliminate (or at least reduce) some 
of the stress of being unhoused, allowing people to focus on rehabilitation.  
• Health. Sanctioned encampments offer additional benefits like efficient service 
delivery to a centralized group of people. This centralization allows housing 
navigators and other caseworkers to do their jobs more effectively than when 
meeting with clients sporadically. Permitted encampments can also lessen health 
care burdens when homeless people can live in sanitary conditions and see medical 
professionals regularly, treating chronic illnesses and preventing the spread of 
communicable diseases. 
While many cities have explored authorized encampments as interim solutions to 
homelessness, implementation has been haphazard because of the dearth of practical 
guidance. Though each city surely must tailor its approach to the unique local needs, this brief 
synthesizes some key issues that any city should consider prior to implementing a permitted 
encampment: 
• Operations. Encampment governance can be managed by residents, outside 
specialists, or some combination of the two groups. The governance structure 
should be clear to all parties and reflect the values and objectives of the particular 
encampment. Each party involved in operating the encampment—residents, 
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operating partners, the landowner, and secondary partners like utility providers and 
social service agencies—should be very clear about their respective duties in relation 
to one another to minimize uncertainty and conflict. Further, the intended duration 
for individual residents and for the location of the site will determine many 
operational features (permanence of structures, necessity of internet and other 
utilities, governance structure) and should therefore be identified at the outset. 
• Legal. Given that cities often authorize transitional encampments by ordinance, 
legal considerations are crucial. For example, officials should carefully consider 
zoning laws to allow for an appropriate number of encampments throughout the 
municipality. Contracts between the landowner and encampment operator should 
contemplate liability and indemnification. Finally, encampment rules and 
regulations should be drafted and promulgated to ensure residents’ rights are 
understood and respected. 
• Messaging. Any proposed authorized encampment will garner questions and 
concerns from the public, and cities should be prepared to answer each inquiry with 
candor. Public relations efforts should underscore benefits to public health and 
public safety and dispel misconceptions about potential hazards associated with 
encampments. Cities should also emphasize the potential for effective service 
delivery via encampments, given that existing alternatives have not rehoused many 
people in the community. And all messaging should clearly acknowledge that 
authorized encampments are not themselves a solution to homelessness, cannot be 
used to justify complacency or increased criminalization of homelessness, and must 
be paired with continuing efforts towards permanent solutions. 
This brief examines several case studies demonstrating common challenges and 
opportunities posed by different encampment models: encampments hosted by universities, 
operated by third-parties, self-governed, and compelling participation. Next, this brief 
synthesizes the most important considerations any city should examine when developing a 
plan for an authorized encampment. Finally, this brief concludes with overall 
recommendations about how to effectively implement a permitted encampment to maximize 
the utility of this interim approach to solving homelessness. 
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Key Recommendations 
1. Research how similar communities have enacted authorized 
encampments. Many communities are opening sanctioned 
encampments through a variety of approaches. Municipalities 
should work together and share insights so that a new city 
considering creating an authorized encampment can benefit from  
prior experience . 
 
2. Identify clear and specific goals. Is the goal of the encampment to 
respond to a specific health crisis? To create an intentional 
community? To create additional capacity for emergency 
shelters? What subgroup of unhoused people is the target 
population? The purpose of the encampment must be specific 
because it will not only inform how to approach operations, legal 
obligations, and messaging, but also how to measure success. 
Incorporate the fundamental goals of the encampment into 
evaluations of its effectiveness. 
 
3. Approach those goals realistically and acknowledge their 
shortcomings. Rehousing people experiencing homelessness 
takes time, and cities should take care not to set unattainable 
benchmarks. Cities should also resist overselling the merits of 
sanctioned encampments because they can functionally exclude 
people in many of the ways shelters do. Cities should not punish 
individuals for whom authorized encampments are not a viable 
option.  
 
4. Set clear expectations and follow through consistently. Operations 
will run more smoothly when all parties understand their own 
responsibilities. Clear standards and procedures can also 
minimize conflict within the encampment as well as between it 
and the surrounding community. 
 
5. Genuinely commit to whatever community structure has been 
selected. The dynamics and priorities of the encampment may 
change over time, as may community support for the endeavor. 
Any alterations to rules or performance measures should be in 
service to the encampment’s underlying mission. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, communities across the country have experienced drastic increases in 
the number of people experiencing homelessness, and existing low-income housing and 
shelter facilities have been inadequate to meet the needs of the growing population.3 For 
example, in King County, Washington, the most recent point-in-time count showed nearly 
twelve thousand people experiencing homelessness in January 2017.4 Nearly half of the people 
counted were left 
unsheltered, once all the beds 
were full in existing 
emergency shelters.5 Of the 
5,485 unsheltered people in 
that county, most were 
staying in vehicles, on the 
street, or in tents.6 In addition 
to the lack of space available 
in emergency shelters and 
transitional housing 
programs, these options are 
often functionally 
inaccessible for many people 
experiencing homelessness.7 
As a result, many unhoused 
people have begun living in 
                                                             
3 See, e.g., ALL HOME, COUNT US IN: SEATTLE/KING COUNTY POINT-IN-TIME COUNT OF PERSONS EXPERIENCING 
HOMELESSNESS 8 (2017) http://allhomekc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2017-King-PIT-Count-Comprehensive-
Report-FINAL-DRAFT-5.31.17.pdf [hereinafter, COUNT US IN] (illustrating that of the nearly twelve thousand 
people experiencing homelessness in King county, 5,485 were left unsheltered, according to that county’s most 
recent point-in-time count). See also, NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, HOMELESSNESS IN 
AMERICA: OVERVIEW OF DATA AND CAUSES (2015), https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Homeless_Stats_Fact_Sheet 
(presenting data demonstrating significant increases in homelessness since the 2008 economic recession).  
4 All Home, HOMELESSNESS IN KING COUNTY, (JAN. 27, 2017) http://allhomekc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-
Count-Us-In-Infographic.pdf. It should be noted that point-in-time counts assuredly underestimate the actual 
number of unhoused people because such data is difficult to collect. See Sara Rankin, The Influence of Exile, 76 MD. 
L. REV. 4, 44 n. 227 (2016); Paul Boden, Homeless Head Counts Help No One, SF GATE (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Homeless-head-counts-helpno-one-4254191.php ("At best, 
this method is an elementary and ineffective way to determine how many people exist without housing."). 
5 COUNT US IN, supra note 3. 
6 Id. 
7 For example, shelter rules requiring identification, excluding people with criminal records, or dividing families 
based on gender can have the effect of excluding people from the outset. Others avoid shelters because of unsafe 
or unsanitary conditions, or policies that discriminate against gay, lesbian, and trans individuals. For more 
information on barriers to accessing shelters, see Suzanne Skinner, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy 
Project, SHUT OUT: HOW BARRIERS OFTEN PREVENT MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO EMERGENCY SHELTER (Sara Rankin, ed., 
2016).  
  
Nearly half of the people experiencing homelessness in King County 
are unsheltered, according to the 2017 point-in-time count.3 
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outdoor communities, or homeless encampments, for safety in numbers and other group 
support mechanisms.8  
An authorized encampment is a community of unhoused people lawfully living 
outdoors on property owned by a city, church, or university, often operated by some 
combination of camp residents and partner organizations with human services expertise.9 
Cities, churches, and other entities have explored authorized encampments as interim 
solutions to homelessness for at least the past ten years but have often done so haphazardly 
because guidance on how best to pursue them is wanting.  
Authorized encampments are not themselves 
permanent solutions to homelessness.10 But, 
in communities that lack sufficient shelter and 
affordable housing, authorized encampments 
can offer safer, more stable temporary living 
environments than other alternatives such as 
living alone or in pairs in other public spaces.11 
                                                             
8 See Samir Junejo, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, NO REST FOR THE WEARY: WHY CITIES 
SHOULD EMBRACE HOMELESS ENCAMPMENTS (Sara Rankin & Susanne Skinner eds., 2016). 
9 City of Seattle, City-Sanctioned Encampments, HOMELESSNESS RESPONSE, 
https://www.seattle.gov/homelessness/sanctioned-encampments [hereinafter Seattle City-Sanctioned 
Encampments]; Zachary Clark, How Pacific Northwest Cities Have Made Space for Homeless Encampments, SAN 
FRANCISCO PUBLIC PRESS (Mar. 3, 2017), http://sfpublicpress.org/news/2017-03/how-northwest-cities-have-made-
space-for-homeless-encampments. 
10 Nor do homeless rights advocates uniformly embrace homeless encampments as a means to address 
homelessness. For example, consultant Barbara Poppe, who was hired to develop Seattle’s plan to address 
homelessness in 2016, described encampments as “a real distraction from investing in solutions.”  Daniel 
Beekman, Stop Opening Tent Cities, Homelessness Expert Tells Seattle Leaders, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/stop-opening-tent-cities-homelessness-expert-tells-seattle-
leaders/.  See also United States Interagency Council on Homelessness, Ending Homelessness for People in 
Encampments: Advancing the Dialogue 2 (2015) (expressing concern that costly homeless encampment 
operations can prevent funding from going directly to permanent housing and “distract communities from 
focusing on” permanent solutions); J. D. Morris, Sonoma County to Shut Down Roseland Homeless Encampments, 
Connect Residents with Services, THE PRESS DEMOCRAT (Feb. 25, 2018) (“Activists are trying to secure another Santa 
Rosa location for an authorized encampment, but the idea faces resistance from city policymakers who view it as 
out of step with their focus on getting homeless people into shelter or long-term housing.”), 
http://www.pressdemocrat.com/news/8020042-181/sonoma-county-to-shut-down; but see generally Junejo, supra 
note 8. Other homeless rights advocates have cautioned overselling authorized encampments as solutions to 
homelessness, criticizing “reclassif[ication] of those living in sanctioned encampments as residing in emergency 
shelter” for the purposes of a point-in-time count as “useless legerdemain . . . trickery, cunning, artifice, deceit 
and deception . . . rebrand itself, calculated to reassure us of progress while the homeless crisis steadily deepens 
and more people die year after year.” Tim Harris, Director’s Corner: “Without Shelter, People Die" Isn’t Just a 
Hyperbolic Slogan, REAL CHANGE NEWS (Aug. 2, 2017). 
11 Telephone Interview with Paul Boden, Executive and Organizing Director, Western Regional Advocacy Project 
(October 31, 2017). Because “theft, sweeps, and loss of property are a part of life for homeless folks,” it is a vast 
improvement for an authorized encampment resident to be able to leave for the day, certain that his belongings 
will still be there when he returns. Hanna Brooks Olson, Access Denied: What Happens When Barriers are Lifted, 
In communities that lack sufficient 
shelter, authorized encampments 
can offer safer, more stable 
temporary living arrangements 
than other alternatives.11 
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Unfortunately, traditional shelter and transitional housing services in many cities 
cannot meet the needs of their local homeless population due to insufficient funding, barriers 
to entry, inadequate protections or services, or some combination of the above.12 And, in the 
absence of long-term solutions to homelessness and the affordable housing crisis, “homeless 
people need a place to sleep, shelter themselves, and store belongings.”13 Authorized 
encampments provide an alternative temporary living environment with some safety and 
security14 and a sense of community15 and, potentially, efficient access to supportive services 
to help residents transition into permanent housing.16 Centralizing a group of unhoused people 
together also allows for more efficient service delivery for basic needs like food, running water, 
and restrooms. Although homeless 
encampments are not a new 
invention,17 sanctioned encampments 
are a relatively recent trend,18 
representing many cities’ 
legitimization of this interim option 
for people experiencing 
homelessness, making it easier for 
people living in these environments to 
re-establish a sense of self-
determination and stability crucial to 
becoming rehoused.  
                                                             
REAL CHANGE NEWS (June 28, 2017), http://realchangenews.org/2017/06/28/access-denied-what-happens-when-
barriers-are-lifted [hereinafter Olson, Access Denied]. 
12 Julie Hunter, Paul Linden-Retek, Sirine Shebaya, and Samuel Halpert, National Law Center on Homelessness 
and Poverty, WELCOME HOME: THE RISE OF TENT CITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (Hope Metcalf, Eric Tars, Heather 
Maria Johnson eds., 2014); Junejo, supra note 8 at 3; Skinner, supra note 7. 
13 NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, HOMELESSNESS, TENT CITY USA 12 (2017), 
https://www.nlchp.org/Tent_City_USA_2017 [hereinafter TENT CITY USA].  
14 Unhoused people are often subjected to laws that prohibit public camping and criminalize engaging in basic life-
sustaining activities like sitting, standing, sleeping, urination, and defection in public places. See Justin Olson & 
Scott MacDonald, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, WASHINGTON’S WAR ON THE VISIBLY POOR: 
A SURVEY OF CRIMINALIZING ORDINANCES AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT (Sara Rankin, ed., 2015). Cities often “sweep” 
unauthorized encampments instead of or in addition to citing people for public camping, forcing people to move, 
and often seizing and destroying whatever belongings the individuals are unable to carry with them. See Junejo, 
supra note 8 at 15–21. One of the major benefits authorized encampments can offer is the guarantee that one can 
return to the same place to sleep night after night and that one’s belongings can remain secure there.  
15 Gretchen Schultz, Vendor Profile: Dennis, REAL CHANGE (Mar. 7, 2018), 
http://www.realchangenews.org/2018/03/07/vendor-profile-dennis. ("'Anybody could become homeless. But they 
shouldn’t stay there. I just hate to see the people laying and sleeping on the sidewalk. The tent city was a big step 
up from that itself, just being an organized group. And that must be because I like being around other 
people . . . It’d be nice if Seattle sanctioned more urban encampments like that.'") 
16 Olson, Access Denied, supra note 11. 
17 See TENT CITY USA, supra note 13 at 7 (noting a 1,342% increase in “unique homeless encampments reported in 
the media” from 2007 to 2016). 
18 Only 4% of encampments are legal. Id. 
  
National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty13 
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Operational structures for encampments 
can vary. Some permitted encampments have 
evolved from unauthorized communities that 
form group living agreements while 
unsanctioned (herein called “organically-seeded 
encampments”); these communities often have 
the desire and capacity to self-manage many of 
their operations once they achieve permitted 
status.19 Operating partners for such 
encampments might be less involved in the day-
to-day operations or decision-making, but could 
facilitate secondary partnerships with utilities, 
waste management, housing navigators, or 
other service providers.  
Other permitted encampments have been formed after a city has designated an 
authorized encampment site, and thus require a partner organization to actually operate the 
site, managing logistics as well as enforcing rules and regulations (herein called “officially-
seeded encampments”).20 Officially-seeded encampments have been criticized by advocates 
concerned about cities authorizing encampments as repositories for people getting swept 
from their unauthorized camping sites, forcing relocation rather than allowing people to live in 
encampments by choice; this approach defeats the purpose of preserving autonomy in 
authorized encampments.21 However, organically-seeded encampments may be especially 
vulnerable to problems with oversight or inadequate supportive services.22 Any encampment 
engaging residents in its governance or management faces a difficult tension: it must retain 
strong, experienced leaders within the community, but its ultimate goal is to move those 
individuals into permanent housing, thereby removing the strongest candidates from self-
governance roles.23 
This brief centralizes best practices developed by some host sites, operating partners, 
encampment leadership, and governmental actors on the West Coast, given the alarming 
increase in homelessness in this part of the country since 2015.24 Part I examines several case 
studies selected for variety and comparison of different encampment models: encampments 
                                                             
19 See, i.e., Dignity Village and Camp Second Chance, infra Part I(C). 
20 See, i.e., San Diego, Cal. and Tacoma, Wash., infra Part I(D). 
21 Interview with Paul Boden, supra note 11; Telephone Interview with David Baum, Community Advocate 
(October 24, 2017). 
22 Telephone Interview with Polly Trout, Executive Director, Patacara Community Services (October 12, 2017); 
Telephone Interview with Krystal Koop, Community Advocate (November 2, 2017). 
23 Interview with Polly Trout, supra note 22. 
24 Christopher Weber and Geoff Mulvihill, America’s Homeless Population Rises for First Time in Years, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/47662ad74baf4bb09f40619e4fd25a94. While the national 
homeless population increased by about 1 percent since 2016—the first increase since 2010—increases have been 
generally much higher in West Coast cities like Seattle and Los Angeles. Notably, the number of unsheltered 
people has risen disproportionately faster than compared to the number of people experiencing homelessness 
overall. Id. 
This brief compares a variety of 
encampment models:  
• Encampments hosted by 
universities; 
• Encampments operated by 
third-party entities;  
• Self-governed 
encampments; and 
• Compulsory encampments. 
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hosted by universities, encampments operated by third-party entities, self-governed 
encampments, and compulsory encampments. The selected case studies are by no means 
exhaustive but represent a range of operational approaches that demonstrate some of the 
most significant hurdles and advantages of encampments.  
Based on insights gleaned from the case studies, Parts II-IV discuss significant 
opportunities and challenges that should be considered by any city or entity planning to 
implement an authorized encampment. Part II details operational issues like duration and 
delegating duties. Part III discusses legal issues including liability and residents’ rights. Part IV 
outlines the major points for messaging or public relations efforts, like the benefits of public 
health and safety, efficiency, and community enrichment. The brief concludes with general 
observations and critical recommendations for advocates of permitted encampments. 
I. Case Studies 
The following case studies demonstrate a variety of operational, legal, and social 
challenges and opportunities evident in authorized encampments in Seattle, Washington; 
Tacoma, Washington; Portland, Oregon; and San Diego, California. Although each 
encampment is unique, the selected sites can be broadly categorized based on their most 
significant distinguishing features. First, encampments hosted by universities pose unique 
opportunities for community engagement—both with pedagogical opportunities and with 
additional stakeholders to address in any messaging efforts. Second, encampments operated 
by a third-party entity (other than the landowner or encampment residents themselves) enjoy 
valuable expertise and oversight, but at the cost of removing some degree of autonomy from 
the encampment residents. Third, self-governed encampments emphasize dignity and self-
determination by vesting decision-making power in the encampment residents, but they are 
vulnerable to unethical leadership and uncertain processes. Finally, encampments compelling 
participation in response to public health emergencies represent a locality’s recognition of the 
health risks associated with homelessness, but can force people experiencing homelessness 
into compulsory participation without meaningful alternatives. 
A. University Hosts 
Tent City 3 (TC3) has operated in different locations as a “democratically self-governed 
encampment offering tent shelter and community solidarity” since 2000.25 TC3 operates under 
the umbrella organization Seattle Housing and Resource Effort (SHARE), a grassroots coalition 
of homeless and formerly homeless individuals working together to “eradicate homelessness, 
educate the community, and empower homeless people."26 Each of the major four-year 
universities in Seattle has hosted TC3 at least once: Seattle University in February 2005; 
Seattle Pacific University in winter 2012–2013, 2015–2016, and 2017–2018; and University of 
                                                             
25 Jessica Bielenberg, et al., University of Washington School of Public Health, TC3@UW: EVALUATION REPORT 
WINTER 2017 3 (Mar. 9, 2017) [hereinafter TC3@UW] (on file with author). 
26 About Us, SEATTLE HOUSING AND RESOURCE EFFORT/WOMEN’S HOUSING EQUALITY AND ENHANCEMENT LEAGUE, 
http://www.sharewheel.org/aboutus. SHARE’s objectives include increasing visibility of homeless people in order 
to educate the community about the realities of homelessness.  To that end, the organization devised a system of 
rotating tent city locations every 90 days to bring awareness to various neighborhoods around Seattle. Id. 
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Washington in winter 2016–2017. Churches typically host TC3 for ninety-day periods when the 
encampment is not located at a university.27 Students were the primary force pushing for each 
university to host TC3.28 
In each instance that TC3 and universities agreed to partner together, the entities 
detailed their respective responsibilities in a memorandum of understanding (MOU). Critical 
provisions included dates of operation, respective obligations for each entity, joint 
commitments, early termination rights, denying access to campus for TC3 participants or 
SHARE/WHEEL representatives who do not comply with the agreement, and survival of 
obligations.29 Obligations of the host university included permitting use of facilities and 
utilities (space, water, fencing, electricity, garbage and recycling services), specific vehicle 
access points, and indemnification from third party suits for injury or damage caused by 
negligence of SPU representatives.30 SHARE/WHEEL’s obligations included ensuring secure 
checkpoints staffed by TC3 residents, construction and maintenance, enforcing the TC3 Code 
of Conduct, responsibility for damages, insurance coverage, and indemnification from third 
party suits for injury, damage, or loss caused by TC3 and SHARE/WHEEL representatives.31 
Besides the challenges and benefits associated with operating an authorized 
encampment on city land, university hosts must consider other obstacles and opportunities 
inherent to the institutions. For example, universities face additional constituent groups for 
public relations beyond the neighborhood residents and nearby businesses. Students, parents, 
alumni, faculty, and staff all have an interest in a university’s decision to host a homeless 
encampment; taxpayers also 
constitute stakeholders in a 
public university. Universities’ 
pedagogical roles also present 
opportunities and potential 
pitfalls. Students can gain 
practical experience in the fields 
of medicine, law, and sociology 
by working directly with 
encampment residents. 
However, universities should 
scrutinize whether they are 
                                                             
27 For scoping purposes, this brief does not address considerations unique to encampments hosted by faith-based 
entities. For information on religious land use and homeless services, see Kate Means, Seattle University 
Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, FAITH IS THE FIRST STEP: FAITH-BASED SOLUTIONS TO HOMELESSNESS (Sara Rankin 
ed., 2018). 
28 Telephone Interview with Joe Orlando, Director of the Center for Jesuit Education, Seattle University 
(September 28, 2017); Ana Marie Cauce, UW to Host Tent City 3 for 90 Days in Winter 2017, UNIVERSITY OF 
WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (June 8, 2016), http://www.washington.edu/president/2016/06/08/uw-to-
host-tent-city-3-for-90-days-in-winter-2017/; About SPU’s Homeless Initiative, ENGAGING HOMELESSNESS, 
http://spu.edu/engaging-homelessness/about.  
29 Tent City 3 Contract with SPU for 2014–2015 [Appendix]. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
Photo credit: Seattle Pacific University.28 
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asking too much of encampment residents by putting them in the role of teachers. Likewise, 
residents of the encampments should carefully consider how this educational experience could 
be structured to be beneficial to the encampment residents themselves.32 
The university-hosted case studies that follow demonstrate several benefits and 
obstacles associated with situating authorized encampments in a collegiate environment. 
While each university took different approaches to bringing TC3 to its campus, all shared 
common considerations: persuading their constituencies to allow the partnership, deciding on 
location and duration of the stay, determining legal obligations and operational duties, and 
designing educational opportunities. Overall, the universities and encampment residents 
found that the partnerships had humanizing and community-building effects. 
1. Seattle University 
Dates of Operation February 2005 (one month) 
Capacity 60–80 people 
Location Tennis courts, southeast corner of campus 
Seattle University (SU) was the first university in the country to host a tent 
encampment when it invited TC3 to campus in February 2005.33 Students in the university’s 
graduate program in Educational Leadership studied tent cities and saw an opportunity for the 
school’s educational programming to intersect with its Jesuit mission by hosting a tent city on 
campus.34 Over several months, the university and the leadership of TC3 planned and 
negotiated location, duration, and the utilities and services the school would provide.35  
As the university-encampment partnership was such a new innovation, the parties 
agreed to a stay lasting one month. A court order allowed private entities to host homeless 
encampments for a maximum of 90 days, and the TC3 leadership felt that moving was such a 
considerable undertaking, it would only be worthwhile if they could stay for at least a month in 
the new location.36 TC3 was set up on the school’s tennis courts because encampment 
leadership had emphasized the importance of hard surfaces (less mud during Seattle’s rainy 
winter months) and fencing (for the residents’ safety).37 The tennis courts also had the 
advantage of lighting—the school kept the lights on later than they would for the courts’ 
                                                             
32 See TC3@UW, infra note 107 (recommending designing classes specifically for the benefit of encampment 
residents, like resume writing or job interviewing, during TC3’s next stay at University of Washington).  
33 Interview with Joe Orlando, supra note 28. See also Tan Vinh, Homeless Set Up Camp Near Seattle University 
Campus, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 30, 2005, updated Jan. 29, 2005), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/homeless-set-up-camp-near-seattle-university-campus/. 
34 Interview with Joe Orlando, supra note 28. In fact, religious organizations have a long history of providing 
services for homeless people, including hosting encampments. See Means, supra note 27. 
35 Interview with Joe Orlando, supra note 28. 
36 Id. As university hosting was experimental, SU was careful not to “bite off more than it could chew,” and agreed 
to host for one month. Id. 
37 Id. 
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regular athletic use, and the residents appreciated the visibility.38 Ultimately, “the residents [of 
TC3] just wanted space. Everything else [the university provided] was gravy: electricity, water, 
meals.”39 The university considered offering other amenities—like showers, library access, 
even classes for residents—but eventually decided against these extras, careful not to 
overextend themselves.40  
TC3 and University leadership structured an 
integrated relationship for students and residents. 
Seattle University arranged for three categories of 
connections between TC3 residents and the university 
community: educational, community-building, and 
service.41 Educational connections included class tours 
of the camp (within hours and numbers set by camp 
residents) and panels of speakers discussing their experiences with homelessness.42 
Community-building activities like game nights and a Super Bowl viewing party had a 
humanizing effect and allowed students and residents to build authentic relationships.43 The 
hosting relationship also included a service component: nursing and legal clinics with graduate 
students in those programs, meals provided by the university’s dining services, and fundraising 
from the local community to cover moving costs like trucks and portable toilets.44 The 
university’s facilities department even hired a few TC3 residents for temporary jobs, putting a 
little money in the residents’ pockets and providing an employer reference for the future.45 
The effort was preceded by public relations efforts and messaging to the university’s 
constituents. Prior to hosting, Seattle University sent letters out to parents, students, and 
alumni, explaining the plan to host and outlining accountability structures to quell concerns.46 
The overwhelming response was positive—people felt it was a good thing for the university to 
host a homeless encampment and they were glad to hear it was happening.47 Negative 
responses were few, but vehement.48 Negative reactions ranged from alumni pledging never 
to donate another dollar to the university, parents threatening to “sue if their daughter got 
raped by a resident,” and students complaining of being deprived of a tennis court paid for by 
their tuition.49 The university realized that people did not respond well to efforts trying to 
convince them they were wrong or their concerns were misguided. Rather, detractors were 
                                                             
38 The sun sets between 5 and 6 p.m. in Seattle in February. SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, USA—SUNRISE, SUNSET, AND 
DAYLENGTH, FEBRUARY 2005, https://www.timeanddate.com/sun/usa/seattle?month=2&year=2005. 
39 Interview with Joe Orlando, supra note 28 (emphasis by speaker). 
40 Id. 









“The residents were often 
in the role of educators. 
Students came to see 
people as people.”43 
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more satisfied when SU simply provided them with the public safety plan and a description of 
how the university planned to address concerns.50 
Similarly, the university notified residents of 
the neighborhood surrounding the university of the 
plan to host.51 The nearby Baptist Church on Cherry 
Street had hosted homeless encampments, so many 
neighbors were already somewhat familiar with the 
concept.52 Their responses were mostly genuine 
inquiries about implementation, including duration, 
who was in charge of security, and what would happen if there was trouble.53 Some members 
of the business community were not happy about the university’s choice and felt that the 
school was “bringing an unruly element to the neighborhood unnecessarily.”54 But these 
concerns proved to be unfounded. No significant “unruly” incidents were associated with the 
encampment’s presence at the university.55 This outcome is apparently not unique: the most 
recent evaluation of permanent encampments in Seattle notes that the Seattle Police 
Department collected data on crime levels around permitted encampments that show these 
encampments are not associated with any significant increase in crime.56 




December 2014–March 2015 
November 2017–February 2018 
Capacity 60–80 people 
Location Soccer field, northeast edge of campus 
Grassy area in the middle of the central vehicle entrance to campus 
Parking lot, north campus 
Seattle Pacific University (SPU) has hosted TC3 several times, allowing university and 
camp coordinators to develop curriculum, streamline operations, and build lasting 
                                                             
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Interview with Joe Orlando, supra note 28; see Means, supra note 27. 
53 Interview with Joe Orlando, supra note 28. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 CITY OF SEATTLE, Permitted Encampment Evaluation 10 (June 28, 2017), 
http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/HumanServices/AboutUs/Final%202017%20Permitted%20Enc
ampment%20Evaluation.pdf [hereinafter Permitted Encampment Evaluation]. 
Seattle studies suggest there 
is no significant increase in 
crime associated with 
authorized encampments.56 
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relationships.57 SPU hosted for the first time in winter of 2012, again in 2015 and for the third 
time in winter 2017–2018.58 
Over time, SPU learned how the 
location of the encampment relative to 
the rest of campus affected the 
relationships between students and 
encampment residents. The first time 
the university hosted the encampment, 
it was located on a soccer field near the 
edge of campus.59 Though many 
students engaged with encampment 
residents, interaction was selective and 
the location at the edge of campus made 
it easy for many students to completely 
avoid TC3.60 The second time SPU 
hosted, it located the encampment in 
the university’s Tiffany Loop, near the 
student union and several academic 
buildings. This more central location 
allowed students to engage with the 
encampment more frequently.61 The 
third time SPU hosted TC3, it was 
situated on a central visitor parking lot, 
surrounded by the university bookstore, academic buildings, university mailing and copying 
services, and the Center for Applied Learning connected to the School of Business, 
Government, and Economics.62 
Each time SPU has hosted, it has done so for three months, as per SHARE/WHEEL’s 
operational model.63 Although a Seattle city ordinance now allows authorized encampments 
to stay at a permitted location for a year or more,64 TC3 continues to adhere to its older ninety-
day rule. This timeframe may have made more sense back in 2012 when the objective was to 
                                                             
57 Telephone Interview with Niki Amarantides, Director of the Center for Learning, Seattle Pacific University 
(October 6, 2017); Jennifer McKinney & Karen Snedker, From Charity to Change, 15 CONTEXTS 2 at 80, 81 (2016) 
[hereinafter From Charity to Change]. SPU has also developed general guidance for hosting an authorized 
encampment. Hosting a Tent Encampment, SEATTLE PACIFIC UNIVERSITY, http://spu.edu/engaging-
homelessness/hosting-a-tent-encampment. 
58 Interview with Niki Amarantides, supra note 57; Mike Wold, SPU Students Earn an A From Tent City Residents, 
REAL CHANGE NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012), http://realchangenews.org/2012/03/14/spu-students-earn-tent-city-residents. 
59 Campus Map, SEATTLE PACIFIC UNIVERSITY, http://spu.edu/info/maps/index.asp. 
60 Interview with Niki Amarantides, supra note 57. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Frequently Asked Questions, SEATTLE HOUSING AND RESOURCE EFFORT/WOMEN’S HOUSING EQUALITY AND 
ENHANCEMENT LEAGUE, http://www.sharewheel.org/tent-city-f-a-q-s.  
64 SEATTLE, WASH., LAND USE CODE § 23.42.056(E) (2015). 
2017–2018: 





Map: Seattle Pacific University59 
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make tent cities more visible with exposure to as many neighborhoods as possible.65 Since 
homelessness has come to the forefront of public attention in Seattle, some advocates have 
questioned whether frequent tent city moves create more benefits or burdens.66  The shorter 
duration suits the university’s interest because it allows for the pedagogical and philosophical 
benefits of hosting while limiting the university’s expenses.67 The university host model also 
alleviates some of the burden of the frequent moves, as SPU garnered significant support from 
student and community volunteers to assist with load-in and load-out days.68 
As an operating partner, 
SHARE/WHEEL provided a meal 
calendar,69 brought in a free 
dental service van, and oversaw 
inspections with the fire and 
health department.70 TC3 
residents who had engineering 
and layout skills worked with SPU 
facilities to map out waste water, 
power, and Wi-Fi.71 
Timing was one of the 
most crucial considerations for 
SPU’s hosting of TC3.72 Like the 
other universities, each time SPU 
hosted, it did so during winter 
months, when the encampment residents most needed a stable place to stay.73 As a large 
institution, the university absorbed the burden of bringing people inside a university building 
during extreme winter temperatures, wind, and rain.74 The university also needed sufficient 
time to plan and inform their neighbors of the intended land use change, obtain necessary 
permits, develop a memorandum of understanding, and publicize the plans to students and 
                                                             
65 Interview with Niki Amarantides, supra note 57. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. Of course, there are costs associated with brief hosting periods as well; for example, moving costs like trucks, 
tools, and meals for volunteers can add up with frequent moves. Id. 
68 Mike Wold, SPU students Earn an A From Tent City 3 Residents, REAL CHANGE NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012), 
http://realchangenews.org/2012/03/14/spu-students-earn-tent-city-residents; Julia Siemens, City Without Walls: 
Students and Tent City Residents Share Campus Life, SEATTLE PACIFIC UNIVERSITY RESPONSE, 
http://spu.edu/depts/uc/response/new/2012-spring/the-city/city-without-walls.asp.  
69 Community groups can view the public calendar to see which meals have already been accounted for, then 
contact SHARE/WHEEL to sign up to provide a meal on a particular day: Tent City 3, SEATTLE HOUSING AND 
RESOURCE EFFORT/WOMEN’S HOUSING EQUALITY AND ENHANCEMENT LEAGUE, http://www.sharewheel.org/tent-city-3. 
SPU could view the calendar and provide the remaining meals. Interview with Niki Amarantides, supra note 57. 
70 Interview with Niki Amarantides, supra note 57. Tent City 3, SEATTLE PACIFIC UNIVERSITY, http://spu.edu/engaging-
homelessness/tent-city-3. 
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parents.75 Winter was the best option for both the university and for TC3 because it allowed 
time for planning and outreach while maximizing the benefit for the residents. 
Persuading constituents to support the partnership became easier after the first time 
SPU successfully hosted TC3. By the time SPU was considering hosting TC3 for a second time 
in 2012, a new President had joined the university and embraced the notion of hosting an 
encampment as “part of the SPU brand,” even including hosting homeless encampments as 
part of its “core theme” of Christian identity and purpose in the university’s strategic plan.76 
The university President’s enthusiasm for hosting meant funding and support for a standing 
Committee on Homelessness to plan for each instance of hosting.77 This effort framed the act 
of hosting as more than charity, instead grounding it in the university’s theological heritage.78  
Prior to the arrival of TC3 on campus, SPU sent out 
informational emails to students and parents anticipating the 
most pressing questions:  
• Where the encampment would be located; 
• How long the encampment would stay; 
• How hosting the encampment posed opportunities for 
deeper engagement with the university’s pedagogical and Christian values; 
• TC3’s self-governance policies and how it, SHARE/WHEEL, and the university planned 
to address safety issues.79  
SPU also offered several opportunities for students, parents, faculty, and the public to join the 
conversation and learn more about TC3 and homelessness, such as breakout sessions and film 
events as part of its Annual Day of Common Learning.80 
Although the SPU administration was skeptical about hosting the encampment the first 
time, a group of persistent students urged the school to consider it seriously.81 At the request 
of these students, SPU agreed to host. Dr. Snedker offered its first sociology seminar on 
homelessness in 2011 in anticipation of hosting the encampment, and now offers courses on 
issues around homelessness every year.82 In hosting years, Dr. Snedker also offered an advance 
seminar course, approaching homelessness from a service-learning perspective and 
incorporating research methodology skills and genuine relationship building.83 SPU also found 
                                                             
75 Id. 
76Id.; Email from Dan Martin, President, Seattle Pacific University available at http://mailchi.mp/spu.edu/tent-city-
3-returns-to-campus?e=7a1ac2e94e. 
77 Interview with Niki Amarantides, supra note 57. 
78 Id.; About SPU’s Homeless Initiative, ENGAGING HOMELESSNESS, http://spu.edu/engaging-homelessness/about. 
79 SPU letters to Students and Parents [Appendix]. 
80 Jennifer Wilson, Day of Common Learning, SPU CENTER FOR SCHOLARSHIP AND FACULTY DEVELOPMENT (Aug. 3, 
2016), https://digitalobby.spu.edu/csfd/annual-events/. 
81 Id.; Telephone Interview with Karen Snedker, Associate Professor of Sociology, Seattle Pacific University 
(October 6, 2017). 
82 Interview with Karen Snedker, supra note 81; see, e.g., Visual Communication Student Projects on Homelessness, 
Seattle Pacific University, http://spu.edu/about-spu/news/homelessness (art course on Informational Design). 
83 Jennifer McKinney & Karen Snedker, Hosting a Tent City: Student Engagement and Homelessness, 45 TEACHING 
SOCIOLOGY 252, 253 (2017). 
Encampments can 
be “a remarkable 
living classroom."76 
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that besides the academic skills students developed by participating in the course, many 
experienced their own “personal transformations” because of their engagement with the 
residents of TC3.84 
3. University of Washington 
Dates of Operation December 2016–March 2017 
Capacity 60–80 people 
Location Parking lot, southwest edge of campus 
Several groups of professors and students unsuccessfully petitioned UW administration 
to host a tent city in 2006 and again in 2009.85 Eventually, a group called “Tent City Collective” 
(The Collective)—comprised of students, alumni, and TC3 residents—registered as a student 
organization, gathered community support, and developed a proposal for hosting, which the 
university finally accepted.86 Even then, it took several years of planning and community 
outreach before the university was ready to host TC3 for the 2017 winter quarter.87 Given 
university populations, this timeframe meant that many of the student leaders who had 
initiated The Collective had graduated by the time their goal came to fruition.88 The older 
students recruited underclassmen to take responsibility for The Collective’s efforts to keep the 
group’s momentum going.89 
While at UW, TC3 was located on parking lot W35, situated near the southwest corner 
of campus. 90 It was adjacent to the university’s School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences, School 
of Marine and Environmental Affairs, and Joint Institute for the Study of the Atmosphere and 
Ocean.91 While some students and TC3 residents felt that the location was too remote for 
                                                             
84 From Charity to Change, supra note 57, at 81. For example, students reported changes in their “everyday 
conversations with friends, family members, and coworkers” as the students began to share their new 
understandings about poverty and homelessness with others in their lives. Id. at 82. 
85 Interview with Sally Clark, Director of the Office of Regional and Community Relations, University of 
Washington (October 12, 2017); TC3@UW, supra note 25 at 3. 
86 Interview with Sally Clark, supra note 85; TC3@UW supra note 25, at 3. 
87 Interview with Sally Clark, supra note 85; TC3@UW supra note 25, at 3. By this time, University of Washington 
was the only major university in Seattle that had not yet hosted a homeless encampment and it was able to rely 
heavily on the lessons learned and policies developed by the other institutions. Interview with Sally Clark, supra 
note 85. 
88 Interview with Sally Clark, supra note 85. 
89 Id. 
90 Parking Lot (W35), University of Washington, http://www.washington.edu/maps/print/?parking=347. 
91 Learning From and With Our Neighbors, Addressing Homelessness, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, 
http://www.washington.edu/community/homelessness/; The Collective initially proposed 6 potential locations 
that met TC3’s requirements of at least 10,000 ft2 relatively flat hardscape. Interview with Sally Clark, supra note 
85; Ashley Archibald, UW eyes two properties for Tent City 3 site, REAL CHANGE NEWS (June 7, 2016), 
http://realchangenews.org/2016/06/07/uw-eyes-two-properties-tent-city-3-site. 
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much community interaction, other 
students and residents felt that the 
location was actually too highly 
trafficked by students.92 
Other than the land, the 
university’s most vital contributions 
were water and electricity.93 Though the 
university offered other services like Wi-
Fi, showers, and class audits, these 
resources were generally underutilized 
because access was “inconvenient and 
unclear” and somewhat out of line with 
the priorities of the encampment 
residents.94 For example, the university made the Waterfront Activity Center available to TC3 
residents, but only about a third of residents utilized that space, even when extreme winter 
weather made outdoor conditions even more dangerous than typical.95 Instead, many 
residents chose more private arrangements: some went to emergency shelters, a few received 
emergency motel vouchers, and others found places to “couch surf” until the storm passed.96  
UW and The Collective made significant efforts to engage students with TC3 residents 
and issues surrounding homelessness during TC3’s stay at the university. The school offered 
eight academic courses related to homelessness during the quarter it hosted, ranging from a 
“Health and Homelessness” course in the School of Dentistry to a “Housing and Social Policy” 
course in the School of Public Policy and a “Social Issues Composition” course in the English 
Department.97 The university also hosted non-academic community-building events like game 
nights and potlucks.98 Yet, many TC3 residents reported that they felt “the stigma of being 
homeless . . . followed them wherever they [went],” including  the UW campus.99 This feeling 
was likely due, at least in part, to the size of the student body and the reality that some 
students were not well-informed about or even aware of the policies behind TC3’s presence at 
UW.100 
                                                             
92 TC3@UW, supra note 25, at 14. 
93 University of Washington/Tent City 3 Contract [Appendix] 
94 TC3@UW, supra note 25, at 16 (“Overall, there was a disconnect between services/resources provided at UW 
and what residents said they needed.”). 
95 The Waterfront Activity Center was located about half a mile away, with a fireplace, kitchen, hot showers, and 
television. TC3@UW, supra note 25, at 16; Interview with Sally Clark, supra note 85. Nick Allard, Snow Storm 
Leaves Icy Roads, Thousands Without Power, KIRO 7 (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.kiro7.com/news/local/lowland-
snow-threat-to-return-late-sunday-and-monday/490758240.TC3@UW, supra note 25, at 16. 
96 Interview with Sally Clark, supra note 85. 
97 Learning From and With Our Neighbors, supra note 91. 
98 Interview with Sally Clark, supra note 85. 
99 TC3@UW, supra, note 25 at 17. 
100 Interview with Sally Clark, supra note 85; TC3@UW, supra, note 25 at 17. There were over 40,000 students 
enrolled at the Seattle campus for fall of 2016. Fast Facts 2017, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON OFFICE OF PLANNING & 
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As a public institution of higher learning, 
UW felt an intense duty to remain transparent and 
open to community feedback throughout the 
planning process and during its time as host of 
TC3.101 This effort included building a robust page 
on the university website, inviting feedback via 
email and at town-hall meetings, and publishing 
the encampment safety regulations and 
Memorandum of Understanding online.102 
Besides fostering robust learning opportunities and deepening community 
engagement, UW felt that hosting the encampment was a positive move for its reputation.103 It 
was the first public university in the country to host a homeless encampment, which garnered 
a great deal of media attention.104 As the university is often seen as a behemoth, this attention 
helped to cast light on UW’s role as a good neighbor doing its part to support unhoused people 
in Seattle.105 
Importantly, one of the academic courses connected to the encampment was a 
program evaluation course in the university's public health graduate program. The course 
surveyed and interviewed UW community members (students, faculty, staff, and 
administration), TC3 residents, and local businesses and organizations.106 The evaluation found 
that the community would support another opportunity to host TC3 and made several 
recommendations to improve the 
experience of all parties, largely focusing 
on centralizing the needs and desires of 
TC3 residents and investing in and 
acknowledging the efforts made by 
residents, students, and other 
                                                             
101 Interview with Sally Clark, supra note 85. 
102 Learning From and With Our Neighbors, supra note 91; Interview with Sally Clark, supra note 85; Ana Mari 
Cauce, Seeking Your Feedback on Hosting Tent City 3, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (Mar. 31, 
2016), http://www.washington.edu/president/2016/03/31/seeking-your-feedback-on-hosting-tent-city-3/. 
103 Interview with Sally Clark, supra note 85. 
104 Id.; Ashley Archibald, UW Eyes Two Properties for Tent City 3 Site, REAL CHANGE NEWS (June 7, 2016), 
http://realchangenews.org/2016/06/07/uw-eyes-two-properties-tent-city-3-site; Ted Land, Homeless Campers 
Move to UW Campus, KING5 (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.king5.com/news/local/homeless/homeless-campers-
move-to-uw-campus-1/371123249; Jessica Lee, UW is Making Plans to Host Homeless Encampment in 2017, THE 
SEATTLE TIMES (Jun. 9, 2016, updated Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/uw-
president-campus-to-host-homeless-encampment/; Katherine Long, UW Students Get a Lesson in Homelessness 
with Tent City 3, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 14, 2017, updated Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/education/uw-students-get-a-lesson-in-homelessness-with-tent-city-3/; Chetanya Robinson, At UW, 
Students Get Lessons on Homelessness, CROSSCUT (Jan. 17, 2017), http://crosscut.com/2017/01/homeless-students-
meet-on-home-turfs/. 
105 Interview with Sally Clark, supra note 85. 
106 “TC3@UW, supra, note 25. 
As a public institution, UW’s 
expenditures were a matter of 
taxpayer concern: “There 
were a lot of people who 
believe they know how public 
resources should be used."101 
"Students remained engaged and 
have done tremendous work, in 
addition to their class loads, in order 
to make the stay a success.”105 
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volunteers.107 Given the results of the evaluation, the university may consider hosting an 
encampment again in future, “contingent on having the same level of student engagement.”108  
4. Summary of Challenges & Opportunities 
Universities present several unique environmental attributes relevant to hosting an 
encampment.  First, universities provide an additional layer of constituency for public relations. 
All permitted encampments should conduct outreach to neighbors and nearby businesses to 
explain how the encampment will be operated, what purposes it will serve, and how its 
leadership intends to respond to concerns raised by the outside community. However, 
universities answer to additional stakeholders: students, parents, alumni, faculty, and staff—all 
of whom have an interest in how the institution is operated, how its funds are spent, and who is 
permitted on campus.109  
Second, a university’s educational purpose can be integrated into the effort to host the 
encampment. Each university in Seattle that hosted TC3 developed curriculum around the 
encampment, creating practical service-learning opportunities for students in sociology, 
nursing, and legal programs. These courses allow students to learn from real patients and 
clients and to see the results of their efforts in person. Perhaps more important, students that 
directly engaged with encampment residents 
reported transformational experiences: face-
to-face interactions with encampment 
residents created opportunities for those 
students to challenge their own preconceptions 
about homelessness, and many students 
shared their new understandings with other 
people in their lives.110  
In the university context, the opportunities and challenges relating to hosting a 
permitted encampment look like counterweights. The additional layer of constituents presents 
                                                             
107 TC3@UW, supra, note 25 at 22. The report made the following key recommendations: “(1) Commit to hosting a 
tent city again/Institutionalize the option for UW to host tent city again via university policy. (2) Continue and 
expand courses seeking to address causes of homelessness. (3) Identify additional strategies for UW to strengthen 
its response to the Seattle homelessness emergency. (4) Identify a variety of ways to acknowledge student, 
resident, and volunteer contributions (scholarships, credits, internships/practicums). (5) Establish clear 
expectations and communication about resources available to residents. (6) Ensure any engagement is driven by 
resident needs or requests via consistent communication amongst established point people at the camp. (7) Be 
mindful of the pressures on TC3 created by the high stakes associated with a stay at a high-profile university. (8) 
Consider offering classes specifically for TC3 residents, such as skills classes on resume writing and job 
interviewing. (9) Seek financial resources through fundraising or grants prior to a tent city moving in. Investigate 
issues related to fundraising problems through USEED. (10) Raise funds to pay a staff member to assist with 
coordinating a tent city stay to limit the burden put on TCC students. (11) Revisit the RFP review process to vet 
classroom activities associated with TC3 to center the voice of residents.” Id. 
108 Ana Marie Cauce, Tent City 3 Concluding Successful Stay at the UW, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.washington.edu/president/2017/03/15/tent-city-3-concluding-successful-
stay-at-the-uw/. 
109 Public institutions of higher education also answer to taxpayers. 
110 See From Charity to Change, supra note 57. 
“[W]e witnessed students so 
impacted by the experience that 
everyday conversations with 
their friends, family members, 
and coworkers changed.”110 
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opportunities to connect with the local community (and beyond), but also means that the 
university must be prepared to answer those constituent concerns. And while the pedagogical 
opportunities can be both practical and transformational, they also risk appropriating the 
experiences of encampment residents. Universities must be careful about putting 
encampment residents in the position of teachers and respect the wishes of the campers. 
Likewise, encampments and universities considering partnership should work together to 
develop curriculum not only enlightening to the students, but also beneficial to the 
encampment residents themselves. 
  
B. Third-Party Operators 
Authorized encampments in Seattle are typically operated by a third-party entity, 
which provides social services and supervises the daily operations of the encampment. The 
third-party operator also acts as liaison to the City: it applies for the initial land-use permit, 
negotiates contracts with the City and other partners like utility providers, and receives 
reimbursements from the City for some expenses of operating the encampment.111 In Seattle, 
permitted encampments generally evolved from unauthorized encampment communities that 
receive permission to relocate to city-owned land for a one-year period when the City approves 
a new transitional encampment site. Such communities often have existing group living 
agreements, or codes of conduct, which serve as the basis for the operational plans once the 
encampment becomes authorized by the city. The established leadership within those 
communities retain autonomy to varying degrees once the encampment agrees to partner 
with an operator. While third-party operators can offer valuable expertise and oversight, critics 
are concerned this arrangement diminishes the residents’ feeling of self-determination, 
undercutting one of the essential benefits of living in an encampment. 
                                                             
111 SEATTLE, WASH., LAND USE CODE § 23.42.056 (2015). 
Opportunities Challenges 
• The additional layer of 
constituents in the 
university context presents 
numerous opportunities to 
connect with the local 
community. 
• Hosting an encampment 
poses practical and 
transformational 
pedagogical opportunities. 
• The university must also be prepared to answer 
those constituent concerns because 
stakeholders like students, parents, alumni, 
faculty, and staff have significant interests in 
how the institution is operated and who is 
allowed on campus. 
• When universities put residents in the position 
of teachers—or worse, subjects to be studied—
they risk appropriating the experiences of 
encampment residents.  
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1. Nickelsville, SHARE/WHEEL, & LIHI 
Homeless encampments have existed in Seattle for decades,112 but not until November 
2015 did Seattle Mayor Ed Murray and King County Executive Dow Constantine declare states 
of emergency around homelessness, requesting emergency funding and establishing 
administrative authority to create immediate responses to the crisis that had been brewing for 
years.113 The action authorized the city’s first permitted homeless encampments with a land 
use code permitting transitional encampments as interim use for certain types of city-owned 
land.114 Besides outlining zoning requirements for land put to such use, the code requires 
community outreach, operations standards, and a community advisory committee (CAC).115  
The Seattle code also authorizes an operator role for an organization to serve as liaison 
between the City and the encampment to manage daily operations and contracts with 
secondary providers like waste management, volunteers donating meals, and case 
managers.116 Seattle requires that role to be filled by a qualified encampment operator (such as 
Nickelsville, SHARE/WHEEL, or LIHI) vetted by the Human Services Department.117 The Seattle 
encampments are operated through partnerships between these organizations.118 Though the 
terminology is not entirely consistent across the board, LIHI essentially functions as a 
sponsor—responsible for "case management, site development, tiny house construction 
coordination, [and] volunteer management"—while Nickelsville and SHARE/WHEEL are 
responsible for daily management including "enforcing the code of conduct, intake 
procedures, and village oversight" in their respective encampments.119 
Perhaps the most famous organically-seeded encampment in Seattle, Nickelsville was 
established as organized encampment in 2008, when homeless advocates set up an 
unauthorized camp on city-owned land in a highly visible critique of then-Mayor Greg Nickels’ 
                                                             
112 For example, Nickelsville, discussed in greater detail infra Part I(B), was “erected to call attention to Mayor 
Greg Nickels' policy of clearing homeless camps and belongings from public property” in 2008. Cydney Gillis, 
Nickelsville Pitched on Southwest Seattle Vacant Lot, REAL CHANGE NEWS (Mar. 9, 2009), 
http://realchangenews.org/2009/03/09/nickelsville-pitched-southwest-seattle-vacant-lot (“‘There are going to be 
a couple of hundred people here within a couple of days,’” said Anitra Freeman, SHARE activist who also helped 
set up Tent City 2 in 1998. “‘At that point, it's going to be obvious that there are more people needing shelter than 
the mayor has shelter for.’”). 
113 Daniel Beekman & Jack Broom, Mayor, County Exec. Declare ‘State of Emergency’ Over Homelessness, THE 
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/mayor-county-exec-declare-
state-of-emergency-over-homelessness/; Seattle City-Sanctioned Encampments, supra note 9. 
114 SEATTLE, WASH., LAND USE CODE § 23.42.056 (2015). 
115 SEATTLE, WASH., LAND USE CODE §§ 23.42.056(A), (B) (2015). 
116 SEATTLE, WASH., LAND USE CODE § 23.42.056(C) (2015). 
117 Id.; CITY OF SEATTLE HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, 2015 Authorized Encampment Operators Request for 
Qualifications, 2–3, http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/HumanServices/Funding/AEO-RFQ-
2015.pdf (detailing eligibility and program requirements for organizations interested in acting as encampment 
operators). 
118 Email from Bradford Gerber, Tiny House and Volunteer Programs Coordinator, Low Income Housing Institute 
to Evanie Parr, Seattle University School of Law (Apr. 4, 2018) (on file with author). 
119 SEATTLE, WASH., LAND USE CODE § 23.42.056(C) (2015); Id. 
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treatment of homeless people in 
Seattle.120 Over the next several 
years, Nickelsville encampments 
frequently shifted locations in 
response to “sweeps”121 by city 
officials, but the organization was 
eventually approved to operate 
permitted encampments following 
City Council’s approval of the 
authorized encampment ordinance 
in March 2015.122 Today, Nickelsville 
operates three authorized 
encampments: Ballard Nickelsville, 
Georgetown Village, and Othello 
Village.123  
SHARE/WHEEL fills a similar 
managerial role for two of the other sanctioned encampments: Interbay Tent City 5 and Licton 
Springs Village.124 Seattle Housing and Resource Effort (SHARE) and the Women’s Housing 
Equality Enhancement League (WHEEL), collectively SHARE/WHEEL, are partner 
organizations of current and formerly homeless men and women, operating shelters and tent 
cities in King County, Washington.125 
The Low-Income Housing Institute (LIHI) is a Seattle-based organization that provides 
permanent, supportive, and transitional housing services.126 Besides operating several of the 
                                                             
120 Dr. Wes Browning, Opinion, Dr. Wes: Nickelsville is the Mayor’s Fault, REAL CHANGE NEWS (Sept. 17, 2008), 
http://realchangenews.org/2008/09/17/dr-wes-nickelsville-mayor-s-fault; Gillis, supra note 112; John Iwasaki, 
Homeless Start Settling in Fuchsia ‘Nickelsville’, SEATTLE PI (Sept. 22, 2008), 
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Homeless-start-settling-in-fuchsia-Nickelsville-1285979.php; Erik Lacitis, 
150 Tents for Homeless Spring Up on Industrial Land Owned by Seattle, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 23, 2008, updated 
Sept. 25, 2008), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/150-tents-for-homeless-spring-up-on-industrial-
land-owned-by-seattle. 
121 “Sweep” refers to the common government practice of removing tents and other belongings from an 
encampment and forcing residents to leave the site. See Junejo, supra note 8 at 15–20 (discussing how sweeps 
significantly disrupt residents’ lives, fail to effectively relocate residents to shelters, and raise potential claims for 
constitutional violations). 
122 SEATTLE, WASH., LAND USE CODE § 23.42.056 (2015); Daniel Beekman, Seattle City Council Clears Way for 3 New 
Homeless Camps, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015, updated July 29, 2015), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/politics/seattle-city-council-clears-way-for-3-new-homeless-camps/; Daniel Beekman, Only 2 Groups Get OK 
to Operate New, City-Regulated Tent Cities, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Jun. 19, 2015, updated July 29, 2015), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/only-2-groups-get-ok-to-operate-new-city-regulated-tent-
cities/. 
123 Seattle City-Sanctioned Encampments, supra note 9. 
124 Id. 
125 About Us, SEATTLE HOUSING AND RESOURCE EFFORT/WOMEN’S HOUSING EQUALITY AND ENHANCEMENT LEAGUE, 
http://www.sharewheel.org/aboutus. 
126 About, LOW INCOME HOUSING INSTITUTE, https://lihi.org/about/; Telephone Interview with Bradford Gerber, Tiny 
House and Volunteer Programs Coordinator, Low Income Housing Institute (October 12, 2017). 
  
Photo: Real Change News120 
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permitted sites, LIHI acts as fiscal sponsor for the encampments operated by SHARE and 
Nickelsville.127 The City of Seattle funds operational costs like supplies, portable toilets, and 
supportive services staffing, and LIHI has the accounting capabilities to track finances.128 
Community donors fund meals and tiny houses for LIHI's sites.129 As a fiscal partner, LIHI plays 
a supportive role to the day-to-day operators. LIHI acts as a property manager: it coordinates 
supplies and manages volunteers who build tiny homes and platforms for tents.130  
LIHI also provides case management services for the encampments it operates.131 Given 
LIHI’s role as a housing service provider, its staff was experienced in interacting with the 
population of individuals living in homeless encampments and in understanding their service 
needs.132 As of this writing, LIHI operates seven sites, including some authorized encampments 
with few structures, some “tiny home villages,”133 and some hybrids of the two.134 Like most 
shelter programs, LIHI's program success is evaluated by the number of people moved into 
permanent housing.135 
Each of the Seattle encampment operators share oversight with community advisory 
committees (CACs), as required by the city ordinance authorizing encampments.136 The CACs 
for consist of representatives of various stakeholder groups, including camp leadership, 
operator staff, representatives from the city, neighbors, and people who oppose homeless 
encampments. The CACs meet regularly to keep all parties appraised of the recent events at 
the encampment and to hear and respond to concerns from the surrounding community. 
2. Summary of Challenges & Opportunities 
The primary benefits of third-party operators are oversight and expertise. Running an 
authorized encampment is no simple task, and the experience of an operating organization 
can be invaluable. Third-party operators can fill gaps in capacity that encampment residents 
often lack—because they do not know the technical requirements of the secondary providers 
(such as vehicle access points for waste management), do not have the skillset for 
bookkeeping, or do not have the time to oversee the camp because they work. In contrast to 
resident operators, third-party operators can develop expertise and provide impartial 
                                                             
127 Seattle City-Sanctioned Encampments, supra note 9; LIHI publishes instructions for building tiny houses as well 
as explanations on required permitting, and recruits volunteers to supplement its staff’s efforts. Tiny Houses, LOW 
INCOME HOUSING INSTITUTE, https://lihi.org/tiny-houses/. 
128 Interview with Bradford Gerber, supra note 126. 
129 Email from Bradford Gerber, Tiny House and Volunteer Programs Coordinator, Low Income Housing Institute 




133 Tiny Houses, supra note 127. For information on tiny homes and other accessory dwelling units on private land, 
see Tran Dinh, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project & David A. Brewster, Anna C. Fullerton, 
Gregory D. Huckaby, Mamie L. Parks, University of Denver Sturm College of Law Homeless Advocacy Policy 
Project, YES, IN MY BACKYARD: BUILDING ADUS TO ADDRESS HOMELESSNESS (Sara Rankin, Nantiya Ruan, Elie Zweibel 
eds., 2018). 
134 Tiny Houses, supra note 127. 
135 Email from Bradford Gerber, supra note 129. 
136 Interview with Bradford Gerber, supra note 126; SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.42.056(A)(1)(b) (2015). 
 28 
oversight, important qualities for cities concerned about financial transparency and measuring 
success. 
On the other hand, placing authority in the hands of third party can feel paternalistic for 
encampment residents. Just as nonprofit organizations can cultivate expertise from operating 
multiple encampments, individuals who reside in those encampments can develop unique 
perspectives about what encampments need to be successful. Third-party operators risk losing 
sight of the resident experience in favor of their own judgment. Further, the disconnect 
between decision-makers and the people who must live by those decisions can undermine 





Other encampments have rejected the third-party operator model as paternalistic and 
undermining of the self-determination value of a permitted encampment. Instead, these 
encampments govern themselves, valuing democracy above the benefits of third-party 
operating partners. However, self-governed encampments are not immune to the challenges 
that plague other new democracies: few written rules leading to inconsistent application, 
leadership elected based on influence rather than competence, and more. But residents in self-
governed encampments have ownership over the rules they live by, and potentially get more 
out of the community and self-determination aspects of encampment living compared to 
encampments operated by an outside entity. Yet, self-governed encampments struggle to 




• Third-party operators provide 
valuable oversight, particularly 
when they can provide checks and 
balances for encampment 
operations and resolve conflicts 
impartially. 
• These organizations can also offer 
expertise in areas of management 
that a layperson wouldn’t 
necessarily know, like bookkeeping 
or waste management. 
• Placing authority in the hands of a 
third party can feel paternalistic to 
encampment residents who 
understand what an encampment 
needs to be successful from their on-
the-ground experience. 
• The disconnect between decision-
makers and residents can undermine 
benefits to encampment living like 
dignity and autonomy. 
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1. Camp Second Chance 
Dates of Operation April 2016–present (sanctioned February 2017) 
Capacity 40–50 people 
Location Meyers Way, in south Seattle 
Camp Second Chance is an organically-seeded encampment established by former 
Tent City 3 residents who had split with TC3 over disagreements regarding sobriety 
requirements and what self-governance ought to look like in a homeless encampment.137 
Camp Second Chance famously found its home by cutting the lock fencing in a city-owned lot 
near Myers Way so the encampment could move in.138 Initially unauthorized to camp there, 
Camp Second Chance aimed to win over its neighbors’ hearts and support by being friendly, 
well-managed, and exceptionally clean and orderly.139 Camp Second Chance voted for 
Patacara to serve as its fiscal sponsor, leaving self-governance to its residents, and Patacara 
eventually received a contract with the City of Seattle to operate Camp Second Chance as a 
permitted encampment, based on the perseverance of the encampment and acceptance from 
the neighborhood.140 
From its inception, Camp Second Chance envisioned democratic self-governance that 
vested authority to make and enforce policies in the camp residents themselves, rather than in 
an external body like an operating partner.141 Camp Second Chance residents were concerned 
that the encampments authorized by the city of Seattle were more “self-managed,” than “self-
governed,” meaning that campers had significant responsibilities but little power.142 When 
Patacara received its contract with the City of Seattle for Camp Second Chance to become a 
permitted encampment, funding meant that Patacara could hire a site manager.143 This shift in 
                                                             
137 Ashley Archibald, A New Kind of Camp, REAL CHANGE NEWS (Feb. 22, 2017) 
http://realchangenews.org/2017/02/22/new-kind-camp; Interview with Polly Trout, supra note 22. 
138 Reed Ingalls, Breaking Chains and Building Bridges: Patacara Wins Contract for Homeless Camp, 30 NORTHWEST 
DHARMA NEWS 1, https://northwestdharma.org/2017/03/breaking-chains-and-building-bridges-patacara-wins-
contract-for-homeless-camp/. “Patacara Community Services is a faith-based nonprofit offering compassionate 
and respectful care to those who are suffering.” PATACARA COMMUNITY SERVICES, http://patacara.org/. 
139 Daniel Beekman, Proposal Asks Seattle City Council to OK New Limits on Homeless Sweeps on Public Land, THE 
SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016, updated Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/politics/proposal-to-seattle-city-council-seeks-to-further-limit-homeless-sweeps-on-public-land/; Interview 
with Polly Trout, supra note 22. 
140 Dyer Oxley, Seattle’s Camp Second Chance Gets a Second Chance, MY NORTHWEST (Feb. 9, 2017), 
http://mynorthwest.com/539598/camp-second-chance-city-contract/; Interview with Polly Trout, supra note 22. 
141 Interview with Polly Trout, supra note 22. 
142 Id. According to some advocates, Camp Second Chance was established precisely because of the distinction 
between self-governance and self-management. Some people who had been part of TC3 (managed by SHARE) 
were unhappy with that camp’s management structure and split off to form Camp Second Chance as a more 
independent, democratic encampment. Ashley Archibald, Camp Second Chance Splits with Supporting Nonprofit, 
REAL CHANGE NEWS (Sept. 6, 2017), http://www.realchangenews.org/2017/09/06/camp-second-chance-splits-
supporting-nonprofit. 
143 Interview with Polly Trout, supra note 22.  
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power and influx of resources led to problems when most of the original residents moved on 
into housing, and many of those who remained were resistant to sharing leadership in a robust 
democracy.144 The idealistic model of self-governance was also vulnerable to abuse due to the 
transient nature of the population of encampment residents.145  As some residents moved on 
to other housing arrangements—taking their institutional knowledge with them—it became 
challenging to maintain ethical leadership long-term.146  
Notably, Camp Second Chance itself has not been party to any contract with Patacara 
or with the city, since the encampment is not itself an official entity with legal rights. Rather, 
Patacara contracted with the city directly, and Patacara and Camp Second Chance never 
executed a written agreement specifying the terms of fiscal sponsorship or how power and 
responsibility would be shared.147 Some advocates believe the funding from the City arguably 
“upped the odds” of this dynamic, creating more incentives to “play dirty.”148 Disputes over 
power dynamics, unilateral decision-making, unfair enforcement of camp policies, and a 
general lack of transparency raged, and eventually the camp leadership and its operating 
partner agreed to part ways.149 Ultimately, uncertainty about how the partner organization 
should check decisions made by the encampment residents—or whether the partner 
organization even ought to—became an existential crisis for Camp Second Chance.150 
Camp Second Chance remained at its original location but needed a new organizational 
partner to serve as its fiscal sponsor to retain its permitted status with the City of Seattle. As a 
result, LIHI took over the contract to operate Camp Second Chance. While the new contract 
resolved some of the immediate problems facing Camp Second Chance, like clarifying certain 
roles and policies, it also presented new challenges. Most important, the change in the 
operating partner raised significant disputes over the proper degree of self-governance.151 As 
of this writing, leaders within Camp Second Chance, LIHI staff, and committed allies continue 
to negotiate a balance of authority, oversight, and cooperation.152 




147 Email from David Baum, Community Advocate, to Evanie Parr, Seattle University School of Law (Apr. 6, 2018) 
(on file with author). 
148 Id. 
149 Ashley Archibald, Camp Second Chance Splits with Supporting Nonprofit, REAL CHANGE NEWS (Sept. 6, 2017), 
http://www.realchangenews.org/2017/09/06/camp-second-chance-splits-supporting-nonprofit. 
150 Interview with Polly Trout, supra note 22. According to news reports, parties involved in the split interpreted 
events quiet differently. For example, the camp manager expressed concern that public funds were missing or had 
been misused, and believed he was fired in retaliation for raising these allegations. On the other hand, the 
operating partner believed the camp manager had committed sexual harassment and she expelled him for 
violating the camp’s code of conduct. The operating partner was also concerned that longtime campers (including 
the camp manager) were “consolidating power and preventing the camp from operating as a true democracy.” 
Ashley Archibald, Camp Second Chance Splits with Supporting Nonprofit, REAL CHANGE NEWS (Sept. 6, 2017), 
http://www.realchangenews.org/2017/09/06/camp-second-chance-splits-supporting-nonprofit.  
151 Tracy Record, Camp Second Chance: Transition to New Operator ‘Not Very Smooth Sailing,’ Advisory Committee 
Told, WEST SEATTLE BLOG (Oct. 3, 2017), http://westseattleblog.com/2017/10/camp-second-chance-transition-to-
new-operator-not-very-smooth-sailing-advisory-committee-told/. 
152 Interview with David Baum, supra note 21. 
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2. Dignity Village 
Dates of Operation December 2001–present (sanctioned in 2004) 
Capacity 60 people 
Location Sunderland Yard, in north Portland 
Dignity Village was established as an organically-seeded unauthorized encampment in 
2001 in Portland, Oregon, in response to sweeps of smaller encampments.153 Within a year, 
Dignity Village registered as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, whose mission was to “improve 
the lives of the poor in Portland by operating a “community-based living facility” for people 
unable to find other shelter.154 While the initial encampment changed locations in response to 
frequent sweeps, residents eventually settled in an industrial area in southeast Portland called 
Sunderland Yard, which would become the village’s permanent home.155 In 2004, Dignity 
Village became sanctioned under the state of Oregon’s “transitional housing 
accommodations” statute authorizing municipalities to designate a campground within the 
urban area as an authorized encampment. 156  
Dignity Village operates as a membership-based nonprofit; residents in “good 
standing” comprise the membership of the nonprofit and enjoy voting privileges regarding the 
community policies and decisions at monthly meetings.157 Members in good standing are 
residents who contribute at least ten hours per week of “sweat equity” work in contribution to 
Village operations and maintenance and pay a monthly insurance fee of $35.00.158 Members 
elect a councilors who serve one-year terms, including a Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, 
Secretary, and Treasurer.159 The council meets weekly to report out on recent developments 
and resolve conflicts within the Village.160 While the contract with the City includes a fulltime 
Program Support Specialist staff position, that individual does not have decision-making 
power over Village business; rather, the Specialist provides operational support and acts as 
liaison with service providers.161 
During the most recent significant contract renegotiation in 2012, the City of Portland 
expressed concern about individuals staying at the Village indefinitely, as a sign that the 
                                                             
153 Origins, DIGNITY VILLAGE, https://dignityvillage.org/history/origins/; Telephone Interview with Katie Mays, 
Program Support Specialist, Dignity Village (November 7, 2017). 
154 Mission & Values, DIGNITY VILLAGE, https://dignityvillage.org/about-2/mission-values/. 
155 Origins, supra note 153. 
156 Regulations and Limitations on Transitional Housing Accommodations, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.265 (2015). 
157 Interview with Katie Mays, supra note 153; Articles of Incorporation, DIGNITY VILLAGE, 
https://dignityvillage.org/governance/bylaws/. 
158 Interview with Katie Mays, supra note 153; Entrance Agreement, DIGNITY VILLAGE, 
https://dignityvillage.org/services/entrance-agreement/ [Appendix]. 
159 Articles of Incorporation, supra note 157. 
160 Interview with Katie Mays, supra note 153. 
161 Id. 
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Village was not fulfilling its 
purpose as a transitional living 
space.162 As a result, the Village 
agreed to reactivate a dormant 
policy limiting individual stays to 
two years.163 However, 
extensions are available for 
people on subsidized housing 
wait lists, or awaiting decisions 
from the Social Security 
Administration, as long as they 
actively comply with the 
respective process.164 And, to 
preserve institutional knowledge, 
villagers serving in leadership 
positions can receive extensions 
to complete their terms.165 
However, the Village has no term limits for their leadership positions, so villagers can (and 
sometimes do) stay for several years.166  
Dignity Village has been described as “volatile, precarious, and incredibly resilient” due 
to its self-governance structure.167 For example, the Village has struggled to find member-
residents with the skills to fill certain roles required by its nonprofit status.168 While some 
residents developed ownership over their duties, this process can result in a lack of 
delegation.169 Further, since some residents have lived in the Village for eight or even ten 
years, certain perspectives and sources of power became entrenched, so innovative ideas are 
often shut down quickly.170 
3. Summary of Challenges & Opportunities 
Both self-governed encampments struggle to strike the optimal balance between their 
values of dignity and autonomy with the necessity for oversight and checks and balances. One 
common incident is illustrative of this dilemma:171 










171 This incident is entirely hypothetical, but it represents the kinds of issues that can come up in any encampment 
and how the self-governance structure can complicate their resolution. 
 
Photo: Dignity Village154 
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Residents Anna, Bob, and Catherine live in a self-governed encampment. The rules of 
the encampment are enforced by an elected council, and both Anna and Catherine are 
councilmembers. Among other provisions, the encampment’s code of conduct includes: 
1. A zero-tolerance policy for consuming alcohol on-site; 
2. A general procedure for one resident to accuse another of violating one of the camp 
policies by presenting evidence at a regular council meeting, open to all residents of 
the encampment; and 
3. A right to appeal decisions made by the camp council. 
Resident Anna conflicts with Bob over a personal 
matter, and Anna uses the camp’s zero-tolerance alcohol 
policy to oust Bob from the encampment. Anna plants an 
empty liquor bottle in Bob’s tent while Bob is eating 
dinner. Then, Anna finds Catherine, who is serving on 
security duty. Anna tells Catherine she has seen Bob acting 
intoxicated. Catherine decides that Anna’s description is sufficient cause to enter Bob’s tent, 
where Catherine finds the empty liquor bottle. At the next council meeting, Anna and 
Catherine present evidence against Bob, and Anna uses her position of authority to persuade 
the other councilmembers to vote to evict Bob based on his violation of a non-negotiable rule.  
 In this not uncommon scenario,172 one resident can serve as witness, prosecutor, judge, 
and jury, wielding enormous power over the fate of another person. Bob might have a nominal 
right to appeal the decision, but the result is unlikely to change, particularly if Anna is one of 
the people charged with reviewing Bob’s case. While this arrangement may seem manifestly 
unjust for a person in Bob’s position, it technically comports with the rules and governance 
structure agreed to by all residents of the encampment. And if the encampment has 
deliberately chosen to operate without the oversight of an independent body, it can be very 
difficult to check unethical behavior. 
 Although the self-governance model reflects encampment values of autonomy and 
dignity by vesting the power to determine rules in the residents who must live by them, the 
actual effect can be to diminish the rights of individual residents. A self-governed encampment 
is especially vulnerable to problems like unethical leadership and uncertain processes when it 
lacks an effective mechanism for checks and balances or oversight. 173 This problem is further 
complicated by issues of institutional knowledge: as residents who understand the rules and 
know who might take advantage move on to more stable housing, encampments lose valuable 
perspective that could otherwise protect against unethical leadership. Further, since 
                                                             
172 Interview with Polly Trout, supra note 22; Interview with David Baum, supra note 21. 
173 As in any democratic community, maintaining principled leadership can be extremely challenging when ethics 
are governed by norms rather than rules, and enforcement depends on the commitment of the community to 
speak out. 
One resident can serve 
as witness, prosecutor, 
judge, and jury. 
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homelessness can be an extremely traumatizing experience, self-governance poses the danger 
of further distressing residents when leaders lack training in trauma-informed care.174 
 
D. Compulsory Encampments 
Some cities authorized encampments in response to public health emergencies, 
building new encampment sites and requiring people experiencing homelessness to relocate to 
the newly permitted encampments for their own safety. While these encampments may 
represent cities’ recognition of the detrimental health effects of living outdoors, their 
compulsory participation has raised serious concerns about the manner of implementation. 
1. San Diego, California 
Dates of Operation October 2017—present 
Capacity 136 people 
Location Golden Hill, East San Diego 
San Diego, California authorized its first homeless encampment in October 2017 in 
response to the city’s recent Hepatitis A outbreak. 175 Unhoused people lacked basic sanitation 
and hygiene facilities that would otherwise prevent contamination, and the disease spread 
with devastating efficiency among people experiencing homelessness in downtown San Diego. 
176 “Hepatitis A is spread through unsanitary conditions, and the outbreak has 
                                                             
174 Interview with Tsukina Blessing, Community Advocate (Nov. 28, 2017). 
175 Mike McPhate, California Today: Homeless Camps, With Official Blessing, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/us/california-today-homeless-camps-with-official-
blessing.html?emc=edit_tnt_20171010&nlid=68062483&tntemail0=yl; City Approves Update to Emergency Shelter 
Declaration, SAN DIEGO MAYOR KEVIN. L. FAULCONER, https://www.sandiego.gov/mayor/news/releases/city-
approves-update-emergency-shelter-declaration. 
176 Lauren Schroeder, How San Diego’s Hepatitis A Outbreak Became the Worst the U.S. has Seen in Decades, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (Oct. 8, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-san-diego-hepatitis-20171008-
story.html. Some advocates have indicated that the City of San Diego’s actions in closing its public restrooms in 
conjunction with increased enforcement of its “encroachment” ordinance actually led to the Hepatitis A outbreak. 
See Tent City USA, supra note 13 at 38; SAN DIEGO MUN. CODE § 54.0110. 
Opportunities Challenges 
• Vesting rule-making 
power in encampment 
residents promotes 
autonomy and dignity.  
• The transitional nature of encampments makes 
it difficult to retain ethical leadership over 
time. 
• Enforcing due process is difficult in the absence 
of impartial oversight. 
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disproportionately affected the homeless 
population. More than 370 people have been 
hospitalized and of the 20 people who have died, 
11 were homeless.”177  
In an initial response to the outbreak, the 
City brought in crews to power-wash sidewalks 
with bleach in downtown neighborhoods 
frequently populated by homeless people.178 
Unhoused people camping in downtown areas of 
San Diego had to remove all of their belongings 
for the cleaning, but when they returned later, 
they were met by police who told them “the area 
had to be cleared to break the cycle that has 
caused the hepatitis a virus to spread.”179 Though 
most people cooperated, some were arrested, 
and no one was provided prior notice of this 
police action.180 
To keep homeless people away from the 
downtown areas most plagued by the sanitation 
issue, San Diego opened a sanctioned alternative 
camping site on city-owned land. On a city 
maintenance yard, the site provides space for 136 
individuals, bathrooms, storage, and 24-hour 
security.181 The Alpha Project, a local nonprofit 
that provides transitional housing, emergency 
service, and other outreach and case 
management services, operates the “transitional 
campsite” and provides transportation in and out 
of the camp for residents with medical 
appointments or other business in the downtown 
area.182 However, residents of the encampment 
                                                             
177 Gary Warth, More Homeless Arrested Following Hepatitis A Outbreak, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Nov. 13, 
2017), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/homelessness/sd-me-homeless-arrest-20171109-story.html 
[hereinafter Warth, More Homeless Arrested]. 
178 Gary Warth, Homeless Cleared Out, City Expands Sidewalk Washing, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Sept. 27, 
2017), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/hepatitis-crisis/sd-me-homeless-eviction-20170927-
story.html [hereinafter Warth, Homeless Cleared Out]. 
179 Id.; Associated Press, San Diego Increases Homeless Citations in Hepatitis Outbreak, KPBS (Sept. 28, 2017), 
http://www.kpbs.org/news/2017/sep/28/san-diego-increases-homeless-citations-hepatitis-o/. 
180 Warth, Homeless Cleared Out, supra note 178. 
181 Susan Murphy, San Diego Launches Campground for the Homeless, KPBS (Oct. 9, 2917), 
http://www.kpbs.org/news/2017/oct/09/san-diego-launches-homeless-campground/. 
182 Gary Warth, City-Sanctioned Homeless Camp to Open Monday, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Oct. 4, 2017), 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/hepatitis-crisis/sd-me-homeless-camp-20171002-story.html. 
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have little say in how the encampment is operated.183 Since the Alpha Project is experienced in 
operating transitional housing, it determines the rules by which residents of the encampment 
live.184  
The encampment may 
address the immediate health crisis 
by providing a more sanitary living 
environment and offering medical 
care to people already affected by 
the virus. However, the City paired 
the opening of the sanctioned 
encampment with increased policing 
in the downtown areas most affected by the viral outbreak.185 Citing the need to “keep[] public 
areas clean and prevent[] the unsanitary conditions that helped fuel the outbreak from 
returning,” the City prohibited any further camping in downtown San Diego, effectively 
compelling unhoused people to move to the new permitted encampment.186 Advocates are 
concerned this policy reflects a mere desire to “round up” people experiencing homelessness, 
rather than to establish an intentional community for people to transition into permanent 
housing.187 The San Diego encampment has even been compared to an internment camp, 
based on the tactics of requiring a certain class of people to relocate to a site controlled by 
someone else.188 Further, early reporting suggests that very few individuals have exited in the 
encampment into permanent housing.189 
2. Tacoma, Washington 
 Mitigation Site Stabilization Site 
Dates of Operation May–June 2017 June 2017–present 
Capacity 30–80 people 80 people 
Location East 18th and Portland Avenue, 
Port of Tacoma 
Portland Avenue East and 
Puyallup Avenue, Port of Tacoma 
                                                             
183 Telephone Interview with Michael McConnell, Community Advocate (November 7, 2017). 
184 Id. 
185 Joshua Emerson Smith, After Crackdown on Tent City, Homeless Recount Hepatitis Horror Stories, THE SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIBUNE (Sept. 30, 2017), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/hepatitis-crisis/sd-me-hepatitis-
homeless-20170929-story.html (noting that arrests for “encroachment” or “illegal lodging” tripled in September 
2017, as compared to the same month in 2016). 
186 Warth, More Homeless Arrested, supra note 177 (quoting an email from San Diego Mayor Kevin Faulconer’s 
Press Secretary Greg Block). 
187 Interview with Michael McConnell, supra note 184. 
188 Id. 
189 Andrew Bowen, Data From San Diego’s Homeless “Bridge Shelters” Show Bumpy Start, KPBS (Mar. 9, 2018), 
http://www.kpbs.org/news/2018/mar/09/data-san-diego-homeless-bridge-shelters-tents/. 
“Hepatitis A is spread through unsanitary 
conditions, and the outbreak has 
disproportionately affected the homeless 
population. More than 370 people have 
been hospitalized and of the 20 people 
who have died, 11 were homeless.”186 
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 Tacoma, Washington authorized its first homeless encampment in May 2017, under 
the City Council’s declaration of a state of public health emergency recognizing how 
homelessness impairs people’s physical, mental, and behavioral health.190 Tacoma declared 
the state of emergency after a spike in complaints from business owners concerned about the 
impact of existing unauthorized homeless encampments on their businesses, dating to January 
2017.191 In the spring of 2017, one prominent business voiced louder and stronger concerns 
about a nearby unauthorized homeless encampment that had recently grown to over 100 
individual residents, a very large encampment for a city of Tacoma’s size.192 When Tacoma 
responded by clearing out that encampment, it forced those people into other areas of town, 
growing some of the other encampments from around a dozen residents to thirty or forty.193 
Businesses and neighborhood entities near the smaller encampments then complained about 
the influx of people.194  
The City planned 
to address the public 
health crisis in a three-
phase Emergency 
Temporary Aid and 
Sheltering Plan.195 The 
first phase involved 
bringing social services 
and basic necessities to 
an existing encampment 
to address immediate 
needs for six weeks.196 
Tacoma is currently in its 
second phase, which 
consists of an enclosed, 
                                                             
190 TACOMA, WASH., LAND USE REGULATORY CODE § 13.06.63(B)(4) (2017); Emergency Temporary Aid and Shelter Plan, 
CITY OF TACOMA, WASHINGTON, 
https://www.cityoftacoma.org/government/city_departments/neighborhood_and_community_services/human_s
ervices_division/homelessness_services/emergency_temporary_aid_and_shelter_plan [hereinafter Emergency 
Temporary Aid and Shelter Plan]; Jenna Hanchard, Tacoma Begins Moving Homeless to Temporary Emergency 
Shelter, KING5 (June 26, 2017), http://www.king5.com/news/local/tacoma/tacoma-begins-moving-homeless-to-
temporary-emergency-shelter/452301858; Julia-Grace Sanders, Tacoma’s Doing Something Different on 
Homelessness, CROSSCUT (June 7, 2017), http://crosscut.com/2017/06/tacoma-goes-its-own-way-on-homeless-
emergency/. 
191 Telephone Interview with James Pogue, Director of Homeless Outreach, Comprehensive Life Services 
(November 9, 2017).  
192 Id.; Tacoma’s population is approximately 208,100. About, CITY OF TACOMA, WASHINGTON, FIRE DEPARTMENT, 
https://www.cityoftacoma.org/government/city_departments/fire/About. 
193 Interview with James Pogue, supra note 191; Homeless Eviction From “the Jungle” Encampment, THE NEWS 
TRIBUNE (Dec. 13, 2017), http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/article189667569.html.  
194 Id. 
195 Emergency Temporary Aid and Shelter Plan, supra note 190. 
196 Interview with James Pogue, supra note 191. 
Image: City of Tacoma192 
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temperature-controlled tent with stricter rules and screening processes in addition to 
services.197 The third phase will focus on creating new short-term transitional housing.198 
Phase One paired Tacoma’s first temporary authorized encampment with increased 
law enforcement regarding public camping, car camping, and drug and sex trafficking. The City 
Council passed an emergency zoning and land use ordinance to allow the city to site temporary 
emergency shelters and named one of the larger existing unauthorized encampment sites as 
its first “Mitigation Site.”199 The city contracted with local service providers Comprehensive 
Life Resources and the Tacoma Rescue Mission to manage the site and coordinate service 
delivery.200  
The Mitigation Site, otherwise known by locals as “the compound,” consisted of around 
thirty residents, many who had lived there for a year or more.201 When the City declared that 
site its first permitted encampment, it required people living in other unauthorized sites to 
relocate to the compound, resulting in the population literally doubling overnight.202 The influx 
of unfamiliar people disrupted the individuals already living as a community at the compound, 
including some who had been there for over a year.203 The long-term residents felt 
uncomfortable with so many strangers around, and the newcomers’ experiences were 
chaotic.204  
Establishing the Mitigation Site 
brought social service providers and basic 
amenities to the compound. Prior to the city 
contract, the community had group living 
agreements, which prohibited theft and 
nonresident guests. When the compound 
was named the Mitigation Site, these 
agreements were formalized and the 
residents created leadership roles and 
weekly community meetings.205 A network 
of local organizations set up a robust 
                                                             
197 Hanchard, supra note 190; Interview with James Pogue, supra note 191. 
198 Emergency Temporary Aid and Shelter Plan, supra note 190.  
199 TACOMA, WASH., LAND USE REGULATORY CODE § 13.06.63(B)(4) (2017); Interview with James Pogue, supra note 
191. 
200 Id. Aside from its role in Tacoma’s Emergency Temporary Aid and Sheltering Plan, Comprehensive Life 
Services operates other homelessness services like mental health outreach to people experiencing homelessness 
in Tacoma and business outreach in response to complaints. Id. 
201 Id. The City selected this location based on the number of current occupants, proximity to other encampments, 
and its poor health and safety conditions. June 6, 2017 Study Session Temporary Emergency Aid and Sheltering 
Presentation, CITY OF TACOMA, Washington 9, 
http://cms.cityoftacoma.org/NCS/HSD/HomelessnessServices/StudySessionPresentation-
EmergencyAidandSheltering-June6-2017.pdf [hereinafter June 6, 2017 Study Session]. 
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schedule of services,206 including needle exchanges, healthcare, housing navigators, 
transportation to appointments, food, mental health counseling, and drug treatment.207 These 
service providers also set up a massive email listserv of over 70 providers, and key participants 
still meet weekly to keep each other updated on activities at the Mitigation Site (and later, the 
Stability Site) and solve problems together.208 Amenities included drinking water, 
handwashing stations, portable toilets, and waste disposal.209  
 Because business owners were concerned about drug and sex trafficking attendant to 
the unauthorized encampments, the 
first phase of the City’s plan included 
increased law enforcement efforts.210 
However, no police were stationed at 
the Mitigation Site.211 The site was 
staffed by a security agency 24/7, but 
its job was to protect the City’s assets, 
not to arrest residents.212 While some 
residents were glad police were not 
monitoring their activity at the 
encampment, others would have 
preferred more police protection.213  
Phase One was short term, lasting only for six weeks while the Stability Site for phase 
two was built. Residents at the Mitigation Site were told that the encampment would be shut 
down at the end of June 2017, and anyone living there would be offered a spot at the new 
encampment site.214 Nearly all of the Mitigation Site residents moved to the Stability Site 
when the time came, though some could not stay because they did not meet the criteria for 
entry; others left later to live in environments with more individual freedom.215 
                                                             
206 Tacoma called this service delivery model “Rapid Resource Pop-Up,” emphasizing the temporary nature of the 
encampment and services. Glossary of Terms, TACOMA EMERGENCY TEMPORARY AID AND SHELTER PLAN, 
http://cms.cityoftacoma.org/NCS/HSD/Homelessnessservices/GlossaryofTerms-
EmergencyAidandShelterPlan.pdf. 
207 Interview with James Pogue, supra note 191; June 6, 2017 Study Session, supra note 201, at 10. 
208 Interview with James Pogue, supra note 191. 
209 Id.; June 6, 2017 Study Session, supra note 201, at 10. 
210 Interview with James Pogue, supra note 191; see also June 6, 2017 Study Session, supra note 201, at 11. 
211 Interview with James Pogue, supra note 191. 
212 Id. When planning the Mitigation Site, Tacoma officials consulted with Seattle, San Diego, Portland, and 
Denver on key operational considerations for authorized encampments. Representatives from Seattle reported 
some issues with predatory behavior in encampments, such as individuals staking out bathrooms and demanding 
payment for other residents to use them. Tacoma’s Mitigation Site security monitored the equipment to prevent 
this kind of behavior. Id. 
213 Id.  
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
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In Phase Two, residents live under a 
large tent with running water and space for 
up to eighty-five people.216 A shelter 
provider operates the encampment, known 
as the Stability Site, and has made a 
significant effort to run the encampment 
with input from the residents.217 However, 
keeping residents engaged in leadership has 
been a challenge, likely due to a 
combination of feelings of trauma and stress 
with a lack of ownership in the endeavor. 
Tacoma has had difficulty moving people 
into housing from the outset. Due to the 
scarcity of permanent supportive housing 
facilities in Pierce County, very few people find placements.218 Many potential residents are 
excluded from the Mitigation site, because admission to one of the limited available spaces is 
based on vulnerability.219  
Tacoma City Council is now considering several amendments to the ordinance 
permitting encampments as temporary shelters. Amendments include increasing the number 
of sanctioned encampments allowed in the city from two to six, with no more than two in any 
one police sector.220 The amended regulations would also "allow for a variety of sheltering 
models," including indoor shelters and vehicle residency, and would allow temporary shelters 
to stay in the same location for up to a year.221 Providers are interested in implementing 
                                                             
216 Heather Hansman, Running Water Can Ease the Effects of Homelessness, CITYLAB (Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.citylab.com/amp/article/547505/. 
217 Telephone Interview with Joshua Waguespack, Director of Operations for Homeless Adult Services, Catholic 
Community Services of Western Washington (Nov. 16, 2017). 
218 Candice Rudd, Tacoma Could Spend $7 Million on Homelessness Next Year, Balancing Shelter with Enforcement, 
THE NEWS TRIBUNE (Oct. 6, 2017, updated Oct. 8, 2017), 
http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/article177554166.html (“Of the roughly 140 people who have been 
served at the stability site since it opened in June, nine people have transitioned into housing.”). 
219 Interview with James Pogue, supra note 191. 
220 TACOMA PLANNING COMMISSION, PROJECT: “PROPOSED TEMPORARY SHELTERS PERMANENT REGULATIONS,” STAFF 
ANALYSIS REPORT (2018), 
http://cms.cityoftacoma.org/Planning/Planning%20Commission/PC%20Agendas%202018/Agenda%20Packet%2
0(2-7-18).pdf [hereinafter TACOMA PLANNING COMMISSION, STAFF ANALYSIS REPORT]. The Planning Commission 
recommended defining the number of shelters across the city in terms of police sectors in part due to the 
community policing effort around homelessness in Tacoma, deploying mental health professionals and social 
workers in a multidisciplinary approach to community policing. Telephone interview with Lauren Flemister, Senior 
Planner, City of Tacoma (Apr. 4, 2018). Moreover, the police sectors cross neighborhood boundaries and blend 
more and less affluent communities so that the burden of hosting an encampment is not relegated to a particular 
area of the city. Id. 





additional sanctioned encampments in Tacoma, but felt this longer duration was necessary to 
justify the investment of time and effort of setting up temporary emergency shelter.222 
Perhaps most egregiously, the city followed the 
opening of the encampment with even harsher 
treatment of homeless people who are not residents of 
the permitted encampment: banning public camping.223 
The new ordinance makes “unlawful camping” on 
public property a misdemeanor punishable by 
imprisonment for up to 90 days, a fine up to $1,000, or 
both.224 The camping ban and increased policing 
policies were enacted “to appease some Tacomans who 
complain about negative impacts that can accompany homelessness,”225 despite warnings that 
such a ban was likely to make the problem of homelessness worse and could unconstitutionally 
criminalize homelessness in violation of the Eighth Amendment.226 And, since the Stability Site 
and other shelters are often full, the remaining homeless population has few options for places 
to sleep and camp and avoid citation.227  
3. Summary of Challenges & Opportunities 
The compulsory participation model reflects a city’s recognition of a very serious and 
urgent problem: homelessness is very dangerous to one’s health. However, this approach 
becomes problematic when it means offering unsheltered people the choice between going to 
the new permitted encampment or getting cited or 
arrested, when paired with increased enforcement of 
laws that criminalize homelessness. This compelled 
participation suggests that cities using compulsory 
models probably want to solve the immediate health 
crisis, but they also want to control people. Critics of 
compulsory encampments have compared them to 
internment camps: rounding up a particular class of 
people, informing them they must relocate for their own 
                                                             
222 Interview with Lauren Flemister, supra note 220. 
223 TACOMA, WASH., PUBLIC SAFETY CODE § 8.12.180 (2017) (“unlawful camping”); Matt Driscoll, Tacoma’s Ban on 
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http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/article202769044.html. 
Cities using emergency 
response models 
probably do want to solve 
the immediate health 
crisis, but they also want 
to control people. 
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good or for the public good, and then requiring them to live by rules over which they have no 
ownership. It's challenging to implement an encampment project swiftly without sliding into 
these pitfalls that undermine the value of permitted encampments. 
II. Operational Issues 
Operational structures can and should vary, depending on goals and values of a 
particular encampment and on the social, political, and physical environment of the local area. 
Each encampment will want to set up services for basic necessities like food, water, bathroom 
facilities, and waste disposal. Some encampments may wish to arrange for electricity and 
internet and may build semi-permanent structures like tiny houses as opposed to tents. All 
encampments will also contract with social service providers that might include housing 
navigators, mental health counselors, medical professionals, and vocational skills trainers. This 
Part examines several operational factors affecting the remaining secondary operational 
decisions: duration, delegation of duties, and governance and enforcement. 
A. Duration 
Duration may be limited by city rules or negotiated by parties to address concerns such 
as availability of space and increasing stability for encampment residents.228 For example, 
encampments authorized by the City of Seattle can remain at their permitted locations for one 
year, with an option to renew for a second year.229 Past encampments were permitted for 
shorter periods: Seattle University hosted TC3 for just one month in 2005, and SHARE has 
typically operated its encampments for 90 days.230 Some residents, hosts, and service 
                                                             
228 Telephone Interview with Patrick Downs, Assistant City Attorney, City of Seattle (September 29, 2017). 
229 SEATTLE, WASH., LAND USE CODE § 23.42.056(E) (2015). 
230 Permitted Encampment Evaluation, supra note 56, at 3. SHARE continues to operate several encampments 
separate from those authorized by the City of Seattle; these encampments are typically hosted by churches in 
King County and continue to rotate locations every 90 days. Frequently Asked Questions, SEATTLE HOUSING AND 
RESOURCE EFFORT/WOMEN’S HOUSING EQUALITY AND ENHANCEMENT LEAGUE, http://www.sharewheel.org/tent-city-f-
a-q-s. TC3 is among this category of encampments: not permitted by the City of Seattle but hosted by churches 
and universities for roughly three months at a time. For more information on church-hosted homeless 
encampments and shelters, see Means, supra note 27. 
Opportunities Challenges 
• Compulsory encampments 
often reflect a genuine 
recognition of the urgent 
homelessness crisis and the 
serious health problems 
associated with living 
outdoors. 
• Compulsory encampments are often paired 
with increased policing, criminalizing the 
daily lives of people for whom the 
sanctioned encampments are not a viable 
option. 
• Compulsory encampments reflect a desire to 
control people and deprive residents of 
autonomy. 
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providers felt that 90 days was too disruptive, so encampments on City of Seattle land are now 
authorized for a one-year period with an option to renew for a second year based on 
“successful operation.”231  Success is measured by performance commitments contained in the 
contract between the City and the operator, such as target numbers for meeting emergency 
and immediate shelter needs and individuals entering transitional and permanent housing.232  
In contrast, Tacoma, Washington allows temporary shelters to remain at a location for 
up to 185 days (roughly six months) with the possibility of a “one-time extension of up to 40 
days, or longer in the case of inclement weather.”233 Tacoma further limits temporary shelters 
from returning to the same site only after six 
months have lapsed since the end of the 
previous temporary shelter.234  
Given the significant benefits associated 
with stability and the burdens on the parties 
(both during the stay and associated with each 
move), groups planning for authorized 
encampments should thoughtfully consider a 
host term that strikes the right balance between 
costs and benefits. 
In the university-host context, a short-
term stay (such as 90 days) can coincide well with the academic calendar and appease public 
concerns about the institutions staying focused on their academic purposes.235 However, as the 
university hosting relationship flourishes with deep community engagement and mutual 
learning opportunities between the camp residents and university community, university hosts 
may require more lead time to prepare for even a short-term hosting period. The planning 
period for the university requires all the same operational, legal, and social preparation as 
encampments on religious or city land, but with the additional tasks of cultivating institutional 
buy-in and developing curriculum. Each of the Seattle-based university hosts clarified that they 
could not undertake hosting an encampment without persistent students prepared to take on 
a lot of legwork and institutional leadership amenable to the idea. At the University of 
Washington, for example, this process took several years, meaning that many students 
involved in the initial effort had graduated by the time their vision came to fruition; the student 
organization had to continue to recruit underclassmen to take up the work, knowing that even 
they may not see the encampment at their school before they graduate. 
Perhaps the most important consideration in operating an authorized encampment is 
how the parties envision a mutual end goal of the project. Parties involved in authorized 
encampments share the ultimate goal of ending homelessness, but they may hold different 
                                                             
231 Permitted Encampment Evaluation, supra note 56, at 3. 
232 Id. at 7. 
233 TACOMA, WASH., LAND USE REGULATORY CODE § 13.06.635(4) (2018). 
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Partners must share a specific 
objective for the authorized 
encampment.  Is it an on-going 
intentional community?  
 Or a stop-gap measure for 
people transitioning into 
permanent housing? 
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visions of the role of encampments as a means to that end.236 Partners implementing 
authorized encampments should also share a specific objective—either to operate the 
encampment as an on-going alternative to less-safe outdoor living arrangements or as a stop-
gap measure for people to move into other forms of transitional or permanent housing.237  
Those two approaches involve different logistical and social implications that should be 
carefully planned ahead of time. For example, a long-term encampment might need more 
substantial dwellings like tiny houses (as opposed to tents on pallets) and more sophisticated 
or permanent arrangements for running water and waste management than an environment 
intended for shorter-term residence.238 On the other hand, an encampment modeled as a 
transitional step might do with less permanent dwellings but would require a greater 
investment in service delivery, like a higher ratio of case workers to work to get residents into 
housing.239 
B. Delegation of Duties 
Contracts between the landowner (city or university, for purposes of this brief) and the 
operating partner (for example, Nickelsville, SHARE, or Patacara in the Seattle case studies; 
Alpha Project in San Diego) typically address location and service term, payment, delegation 
of duties relating to hygiene and safety, indemnification, and expectations around 
communication. In Seattle, the obligations of the encampment operator also include 
developing a governance structure  
to create a shared power and decision making structure where residents 
participate in the adoption and enforcement of policy, assist with security and 
property maintenance . . . and share experience and expertise with their peers. 
These experiences are intended to promote balanced and shared power, and 
skill development in conflict resolution, communication and leadership.240 
However, it is unclear how effectively the encampment operators achieve this commendable 
objective. Because the Seattle encampments are managed by organizations with long histories 
of homeless advocacy, the historical governance structures of SHARE/WHEEL and Nickelsville 
have been applied to that city's authorized encampments, regardless of how well they reflect 
the power dynamic desired by the encampment residents.241 
Notably, neither the residents of the encampment nor its governing board are parties 
to this agreement between the operating partner and the landowner. However, each 
encampment is governed by a code of conduct and grievance procedures, incorporated into 
                                                             
236 Telephone Interview with Tim Harris, Founding Director, Real Change Homeless Empowerment Project (Oct. 
26, 2017). 
237 Interview with Krystal Koop, supra note 22. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 CITY OF SEATTLE DEPARTMENT OF CONSTRUCTION & INSPECTIONS DIRECTOR’S RULE 9-2016, HUMAN SERVICES 
DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR’S RULE 2-2016 (2016), http://www.seattle.gov/dpd/codes/dr/DR2016-9docx.pdf. 
241 Email from David Baum, Community Advocate, to Evanie Parr, Seattle University School of Law (Mar. 13, 2018) 
(on file with author). 
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the landowner/operator contract by reference.242 For a well-operated encampment, this tiered 
relationship has many benefits. It allows an organization with infrastructure to work with the 
landowner to work out insurance and financial agreements, while leaving the policy decisions 
about camp governance to the residents who develop the code of conduct. Ideally, the 
organization in the middle understands and can navigate between the needs of the parties on 
either end to work out other important operational concerns like safety policies, meals, and 
service delivery. 
However, such a role is difficult to fill. By its role in the middle, the operating partner 
can be simultaneously pulled in one direction by the encampment residents (who want 
stability and autonomy so they can focus on rehabilitation) and another by local governments 
(who want to get people into housing, but feel pressure to meet deadlines and milestones that 
may not be entirely realistic).The operator must be prepared to take on significant risks 
associated with running an encampment: indemnifying the landowner against any claims 
arising from conduct of residents, staff, or volunteers, and taking the brunt of public opinion. 
243 Successful partnerships cannot be done effectively without trusting relationships between 
all parties.244 
C. Governance & Enforcement 
It is well understood that autonomy is one of the primary benefits of encampment 
living as opposed to homeless shelters; however, autonomy shifts once an encampment 
agrees to comply with an operator and landowner’s needs in exchange for its permitted status. 
The question becomes to what extent camp residents will sacrifice some autonomy and to 
what extent the landowner can be flexible with its requirements. Perhaps most important, this 
bargain is governed by existing power structures, meaning that encampments face automatic 
disadvantages like the risk of sweeps if they remain unauthorized. 
The encampment must retain some sense of self-ownership, if for no other reason than 
the fact that operating partners lack the capacity to do so. 
While the scope of camp authority can vary, the two basic 
models can generally be described as “self-governance” and 
“self-management.”245 Self-governance would involve 
democratic representation from within the encampment 
community and buy-in from neighbors and other 
stakeholders, but ultimately leave policy decisions to the 
encampment residents themselves. In contrast, self-management would shift some of that 
authority to the operator (and arguably to the city as well) but leave implementation to the 
residents on the ground.  
                                                             
242 Incorporation by reference refers to the drafting practice of referring to an external document so as to include 
its contents in the terms of the agreement without actually copying it into the contract itself. 
243 Tim Harris, Editorial, Like it or Not, Seattle Needs SHARE and Nickelsville, REAL CHANGE NEWS (Feb. 17, 2016), 
http://realchangenews.org/2016/02/17/it-or-not-seattle-needs-share-and-nickelsville. 
244 Interview with Tim Harris, supra note 236. 
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Both models pose challenges. A self-governance structure is vulnerable to the dangers 
of entrenched power, corruption, and incompetence present in any true democracy.246 Self-
management can lack sufficient resources and oversight to work effectively.  
Another concern with either model of governance is 
retaining competent, ethical leadership representative of a 
population that is by definition transitory. The question of 
leadership within homeless encampments is truly a double-
edged sword: many residents who hold institutional 
knowledge about how to run the encampment eventually 
become housed. Permanent housing is the goal of authorized 
encampments as interim solutions to homelessness and the goal of virtually all unhoused 
people. But once an individual gets into housing, they are no longer residents of the 
encampment with the requisite personal stake in operating the camp that defines self-
management or self-governance; nor do they necessarily possess the time or interest to 
continue in a leadership role in the camp. This outcome is obviously a boon for the individual, 
but it inevitably means a loss of experienced leadership for the camp and can lead to 
accountability problems among long-term residents.  
How can advocates reconcile the need for long-term memory and leadership 
experience, the benefits of autonomy, and the end goal of getting people out of 
homelessness? Some experts have posited that we still have not answered the question of how 
to create stable, ethical leadership over time, but have suggested mechanisms that might 
support this objective.247  
For example, former residents who get into housing “shouldn’t have to martyr 
themselves” by staying behind to self-govern from within the encampments.248 Rather, 
governing boards could include current and former residents (who have moved into housing) 
who receive compensation for their service.249 These roles could carry meaningful job titles like 
“program coordinator” or “program coordination intern” and include professional 
development and training in self-governance, which could translate to future jobs.250 
Encampments should plan a governance structure that reflects the purpose of the 
encampment. Whether the objective of the encampment is to build an intentional community 
or to respond to an immediate health crisis will inform how much say the residents should 
have, who enforces the rules, and what procedures are necessary to resolve conflicts. 
III. Legal Issues 
Cities often authorize transitional encampments by ordinance, and any encampment 
inevitably involves relationships and agreements between several entities. Therefore, careful 
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legal drafting is critical to every aspect of authorized encampments. Land use ordinances and 
contracts between the primary parties should anticipate limitations and risks posed by 
encampments and should formulate zoning laws and contracts that sufficiently address these 
issues. Further, encampment rules and regulations should be vetted to adequately protect the 
rights of residents, particularly in settings where individual discretion could skew 
administration. The specific legal issues any potential encampment may confront are fact- and 
jurisdiction-specific; however, this section surveys a few common legal considerations. 
A. Zoning & Land Use 
When a city authorizes homeless encampments on public land, it has the authority to 
determine the parameters of an appropriate location. Considerations might include proximity 
to public transportation,251 the nature of the area’s current or nearby uses,252 vehicle 
accessibility for waste disposal and other service providers, the existence or readiness for 
plumbing, and the quality of the surface of the land. A municipality should carefully consider 
the breadth of sizing options and understand how many viable locations would fit the 
parameters.253 A city with a very large homeless population, for example, should consider the 
sizing options so that more than one location could satisfy the standards.254 
Cities may also write operational parameters into the codified permitting requirements. 
For example, the Tacoma Municipal Code authorizes the Director of Planning and 
Development Services to issue permits for temporary homeless shelters “only upon 
demonstration that all public health and safety considerations have been adequately 
addressed” and to revoke permits “if the City determines the site is unfit for human habitation 
based on sanitary conditions or health related concerns.”255 The same Chapter requires 
portable water, toilets, handwashing stations, waste disposal, and minimum spacing 
requirements per resident to prevent overcrowding.256 
                                                             
251 For example, the Land Use Ordinance for Tacoma, Washington requires that “the temporary shelter must be 
located within one-half mile of a bus route that is in service seven days per week.” TACOMA, WASH., LAND USE 
REGULATORY CODE § 13.06.635(14) (2018).) (2018). Seattle similarly requires transitional encampments to be 
located within half a mile of a transit stop, but does not specify how frequently the stop must be in service. 
SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.42.056(B)(5). 
252 For example, the Land Use Ordinance for Seattle, Washington requires transitional encampments to be 
located on property that is zoned industrial, downtown, commercial, or “within a Major Institution Overlay 
district.” SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.42.056(B)(1). A major institution is one that provides medical or educational 
services to the community, meets certain minimum size parameters, and “by nature of its function and size, 
dominates and has the potential to change the character of the surrounding area and/or create significant impacts 
on the area.” SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.84A.025. 
253 Interview with Patrick Downs, supra note 228. See, e.g. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.42.056(B)(6) (requiring 5,000 
square feet of land and a minimum of 100 square feet per occupant); TACOMA, WASH., LAND USE REGULATORY 
CODE § 13.06.635(4)(c) (2018) (requiring a minimum of 7,500 square feet for a shelter serving up to 50 people). 
254 Interview with Patrick Downs, supra note 228. 
255 TACOMA, WASH., LAND USE REGULATORY CODE § 13.06.635(4)(b)(1) (2018). 
256 TACOMA, WASH., LAND USE REGULATORY CODE § 13.06.635(15) (2018). 
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B. Liability 
Liability and insurance coverage may be addressed in the city ordinances authorizing 
encampments and in contracts between landowners and operating organizations.257 It is 
unsurprising that contracts between landowners and operating organizations include 
additional insurance and indemnification clauses. What might be surprising, however, is how 
rarely these clauses are invoked. For example, when a camp-associated dumpster failed to lock 
in place and accidentally rolled into a government vehicle parked near the TC3 encampment at 
University of Washington, no one bothered to file an insurance claim; SHARE simply cut a 
check to cover the costs to repair the dent directly.258 These provisions likely anticipate more 
serious incidents, like violent or negligent conduct by residents or operators that cause 
significant harm to people or property within the encampment or the surrounding community. 
This concern may be grounded in some of the common misconceptions about the behavior of 
homeless people, though research shows these worries are largely misguided.259 
C. Residents’ Rights: Due Process & Contractual Obligations 
Relevant to the earlier discussion of degrees of autonomy and self-governance is the 
question of encampment residents’ legal rights. Given that residents are not typically party to 
the contracts between landowners and operators, do residents have any claims to enforce 
those contracts?260 This question has not yet been tested, perhaps because encampment 
residents are more concerned with their rights relating to camp codes of conduct and removal 
procedures. For example, many codes of conduct specify qualifications for entry and 
prohibited conduct within the encampment, and require signed agreement as a condition to 
become a resident.261 Virtually all encampment codes of conduct contain provisions regarding 
conduct that  can cause a resident to be temporarily or permanently “barred” from the 
encampment, such as violent or threatening behavior toward another resident or violation of 
prohibitions on alcohol or drugs.262 These rules are often among encampments’ zero-tolerance 
policies, so the stakes are high when an individual resident is accused of violating one, and any 
such allegations should not be taken lightly. 
                                                             
257 TACOMA, WASH., LAND USE REGULATORY CODE § 13.06.365(4)(b)(2)(f) (2018) (requiring the sponsoring 
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But do these codes of conduct provide sufficient due process to individuals who might 
challenge their evictions based on alleged violations? For instance, in self-governed 
encampments, the same individual may serve in the roles 
of witness, prosecutor, and judge in an instance of alleged 
rule-breaking. If the encampment rules do not provide for 
some recusal for conflicts of interest, the accused 
individual is not guaranteed that his or her fate will be 
determined by an impartial decision-maker. And if the 
procedure for bringing and deciding a rule violation charge 
is not sufficiently documented, there may be little 
guarantee of a consistent or fair process. 
Further, some legal experts have suggested that codes of conduct that do not specify 
the process or grounds for appeal may unconstitutionally leave residents without due process 
and subject to arbitrary and unfair evictions.263 Considering the utter dearth of rights for 
individuals in homeless shelters, it is not entirely surprising that encampment codes of conduct 
do not contain many meaningful legal protections for residents. 264 But given the unique 
dynamic of authorized encampments run by self-organized individuals, this gap could be an 
opportunity for advocates in the homeless community to push for some major developments 
in legal rights for homeless people. 
Codes of conduct could create binding legal rights and obligations and should be 
drafted carefully to establish clear expectations. While most codes of conduct nominally 
provide for rights to appeal, few adequately describe the process to appeal decisions for 
individuals accused of violating the agreement.265 Unclear or inconsistent appeals processes 
could raise significant due process issues, a complex topic not yet tested in a court of law. 
Similarly, “insurance payments”266 or monthly dues267 could constitute consideration, making 
contracts that require them enforceable in a court of law. Neither has this issue been tested in 
court yet, but it could create another avenue to ensure stronger rights for encampment 
residents. 
Because encampments themselves are not typically considered legally cognizable 
entities, encampment operators should be conscious of how they respect the rights of 
individual residents. People experiencing homelessness have the same rights as housed people 
but are not always treated as such. Encampment operators should make rules and procedures 
clear and accessible to residents to ensure that everyone’s rights are equally protected. 
                                                             
263 City and State anti-discrimination laws would also apply to encampments and could be avenues for relief for 
individuals challenging camp evictions related to protected statuses like mental illness. Email from Tristia 
Bauman, National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, to Sara Rankin, Director, Seattle University 
Homeless Rights Advocacy Project (Oct. 24, 2017) (on file with author). 
264 Id. 
265 See Codes of Conduct, supra note 261 
266 See supra Part I § C(1). 
267 See supra Part I § C(2). 
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IV. Messaging & Social Issues 
Any city planning to open an authorized encampment should be prepared to answer 
many questions and concerns posed by the public and other stakeholders. City ordinances can 
even require operating partners to set up community outreach efforts and mechanisms for 
public input throughout operating the encampment.268 Cities should anticipate the most 
common concerns and be prepared to dispel 
misconceptions and to emphasize the benefits of 
permitted encampments. Sometimes, it may be 
more effective to provide information about how a 
city or host intends to respond to specific concerns 
should they come to fruition, rather than to persuade 
every dissenter of an encampment’s merits.  
Most importantly, cities implementing 
authorized encampments must acknowledge what 
the encampment can and cannot do with candor. 
Most—if not all—authorized encampments replicate at least some of the barriers to existing 
shelters by virtue of limited space and rules in place to protect the residents and the 
surrounding community. This reality means that sanctioning encampments may respond to 
part of the problem with emergency shelters (not enough beds for the number of people 
experiencing homelessness), but they do little to address other functional barriers to shelter, 
let alone the underlying causes of homelessness. Cities should be forthright in their 
communications about the sanctioned encampment and careful not to overstate its role as an 
interim solution to homelessness. Sanctioned encampments are a "critical interim measure" to 
ensure that unhoused people have " a safe and stable place to live," but they should not be the 
solution to a larger housing crisis, nor should their existence be used "to enable complacency 
or increased criminalization of houseless folks who do not or cannot access a sanctioned 
encampment."269  
A. Public Health & Public Safety 
First, uninformed housed people worry about the public health and safety risks posed 
by homeless encampments. However, encampments have been shown not to create health 
and safety problems, even partially resolving those issues sometimes.270 Yet, many people 
mistakenly associate people experiencing homelessness with crime and disease, and any 
hosting entity should be prepared to head off those concerns. 
For example, one night, while Seattle University was hosting Tent City 3, there was an 
altercation between some unhoused people on the far side of campus.271 The fight took place 
                                                             
268 See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.42.056(A) (2015) (requiring at least one community meeting prior to 
implementation and a “Community Advisory Committee” to meet regularly to answer questions and report on 
ongoing encampment operations). 
269 Email from Breanne Schuster, Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, to Evanie Parr, 
Seattle University School of Law (Apr. 25, 2018) (on file with author). 
270 See supra at Part I § (D)(1). 
271 Interview with Joe Orlando, supra note 28. 
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around three in the morning, and the police were called because of a knife injury.272 The 
individuals involved had no relationship to TC3, but were homeless.273 News coverage of the 
fight the next day mentioned that SU was hosting a homeless encampment, as though that 
information was relevant because of the unhoused status of the individuals and the proximity 
to university property (though located centrally in a major urban area).274 Representatives from 
SU spent the day calling news stations, asking them to stop bringing up the encampment in 
the coverage of the fight because one actually had nothing to do with the other, but 
mentioning the encampment in the same news segment suggested a connection.275   
One of the notable restrictions on encampment residency is a zero-tolerance policy for 
individuals with histories as sex offenders. Many authorized encampments ask whether 
individuals are on sex offender registries as part of their screening questions and do not allow 
anyone who says ‘yes’ to join the encampment. Similarly, authorized encampments also 
include sobriety policies, prohibiting any use of drugs or alcohol on site, and making violation 
an eviction-worthy event. These restrictions can assuage some of the public health and safety 
concerns expressed by housed neighbors, especially in the university context. Yet, it is also 
worth noting this exclusionary policy means that people who face some of the most significant 
barriers to housing (including emergency shelters and other transitional housing spaces) are 
also excluded from the authorized encampment environment.276 
Finally, the Seattle Police Department collected data about the frequency of crimes 
committed in the areas around authorized encampments in that city, which shows “no 
significant increase in crime” because of the 
encampment.277 The City of Seattle even suggested 
that the increased traffic of unhoused people in a 
neighborhood hosting an encampment may be the 
source of negative perceptions but noted that further 
study is necessary to understand the impact of 
increased foot traffic.278 
B. Stability & Efficiency 
Cities should also emphasize the potential for effective service delivery via 
encampments, given that existing alternatives have been insufficient to rehouse many people 
in the community. Caring for people experiencing homelessness is costly—from shelter 
operations to sweeps279 and unpaid medical bills. Authorized encampments pose opportunities 





276 See Skinner, supra note 7 at 19–25 (explaining the Housing First model in contrast to the widespread practice of 
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to care for people’s basic needs more efficiently, reducing the costs of policing and medical 
care for unhoused people. Centralizing a group of people with some common social service 
needs can allow social service providers to meet with clients more regularly. 
Further, the mere fact of a stable living arrangement can improve a person’s ability to 
address issues that contribute to homelessness—like loss of income, mental health challenges, 
chemical dependency, or physical illness—and transition back into housing. Cities should 
respond to concerns that permitting homeless encampments enables people to remain 
unhoused should clarify the existing barriers to shelter and transitional housing and emphasize 
how permitted encampments can serve the same purposes as shelters by providing stable 
living environments where people experiencing homelessness can effectively access the 
services they need to become housed again. 
C. Pedagogical Opportunities 
Universities that host homeless 
encampments should underscore the unique 
pedagogical opportunities that encampments 
provide for the collegiate community. If 
encampment residents desire and support 
working with students, the encampment 
environment can offer a microcosm of service-
learning opportunities. From socio-economical 
determinants to health to practical applications 
for dental students and law students studying 
public benefits, residents’ needs present valuable 
learning opportunities for students at universities 
that host encampments. Perhaps most important, direct interaction with people experiencing 
homelessness can have a transformative effect on students, breaking down stereotypes and 
inspiring students to become compassionate citizens. In this way, hosting homeless 
encampments can support universities’ values and missions around community engagement 
and religious or moral responsibilities.280 
However, universities should be careful that their pedagogical activities do not cross 
the line into appropriating the experiences of unhoused people. “[O]verly stud[ying]” residents 
can detract from the community-building objectives of hosting an encampment by 
dehumanizing residents and subjecting them to invasive questioning.281 Universities should 
work closely with the encampment when planning courses around hosting, so boundaries are 
clear and encampment residents are not subjected to more pedagogical engagement than 
they are comfortable with. Universities should also be mindful that individual residents’ 
feelings may change during the stay and should respect their wishes for more privacy. 
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D. Continuing Efforts for Permanent Solutions to Homelessness 
Finally, all messaging around encampments should 
clarify that permitted encampments are not themselves a 
solution to homelessness. While some individuals may prefer 
living in encampments long-term, conditions can still be harsh 
and volatile sometimes. Cities that cannot provide for a 
sizeable number of homeless people through shelters and 
other traditional rehousing options must understand that 
sanctioned encampments are not sustainable options for many people. Authorized 
encampments are best understood as interim solutions to improve the immediate conditions 
of people experiencing homelessness while the particular city invests in and develops 
permanent solutions like low-income housing, transitional housing, mental health services, 
affordable healthcare, supervised consumption sites, low-barrier employment opportunities, 
or all of the above. 
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Authorized encampments can be effective interim solutions to homelessness in 
communities where traditional shelters options are inadequate to meet the needs of people 
experiencing homelessness. However, cities implementing permitted encampments should be 
aware of the critical opportunities and challenges encampments present, and they should 
carefully consider how they plan to address the most significant issues relevant to the locality. 
There are five recommendations for how to approach created a successful sanctioned 
encampment program: 
1. Start with Research. Many communities are experimenting with sanctioned 
encampments in response to the quickly intensifying homelessness crisis. Cities 
considering implementing authorized encampments should look to those who came 
before for insights, rather than reinventing the wheel. 
2. Identify Goals. These goals must be more specific than “ending homelessness.” Is the 
goal of the encampment to respond to a specific health crisis, so speed is more 
important than developing sustainable self-governance? Is creating an intentional 
community important, so residents should be allowed to stay for longer periods and 
develop skills that could transfer to income-generating work? Or is the goal simply to 
improve the immediate conditions of people experiencing homelessness while more 
shelter and transitional housing is built? The fundamental purpose of the encampment 
will inform how to measure its success, and how to approach operations, legal 
obligations, and messaging.  Decide on the objectives of the encampments from the 
outset and build evaluation metrics that reflect those goals. 
3. Be Realistic. The goals identified under the previous recommendation must be 
realistic. If the goal is for the encampment to serve as a stopover point to more 
specialized interventions, the city must be realistic about how long it will take for each 
person to access and transition into the next steps. Cities must also acknowledge the 
reality that not every person experiencing homelessness can access encampments—
space limitations, sobriety requirements, and zero-tolerance policies for people with 
criminal histories can functionally exclude people just as shelters often do. Cities need 
understand the limits of encampments and not punish the remaining unhoused people 
for whom permitted encampments are not a viable option. Relatedly, cities and 
operators should be careful not to oversell the merits of sanctioned encampments to 
themselves and to other stakeholders; the existence of permitted encampments should 
not enable complacency. 
4. Set and Follow Clear Expectations. Powers, rights, and duties regarding governance 
and enforcement in the encampment should be exceedingly clear to all involved. 
Operators should develop straightforward rules and regulations and follow them 
consistently. Similarly, roles should be delineated between governing bodies, service 
providers, and resident security forces, so any issues that arise can be dealt with swiftly, 
without causing more confusion or disruption. In the same vein, the neighboring 
community should share a clear understanding about the role and operations of the 
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encampment, so neighbors can effectively support the successful operation of the 
encampment. 
5. Genuinely Commit to Community Structure. Whatever governance structure or 
overall goals of the encampment, all parties involved must genuinely commit to and 
respect the objectives of the encampment. Any alterations to rules or regulations 
should be in service to the encampment’s mission to maintain the integrity of the 
project. 
Each recommendation is vital to the success of any model of sanctioned encampment. But 
most important, parties implementing authorized encampments must do so thoughtfully, with 
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